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ABSTRACT
“No regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does significantly more 
harm than good.” Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015).
Most federal regulations are well intended, but many also 
create substantial economic hardships. Charged with balancing the 
costs and benefits of potential regulatory actions is the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Since its creation 
through an executive order, OIRA diligently subjected the most 
significant proposed regulations to rigorous cost–benefit analysis. 
However, cost assessment rarely begins until substantial resources 
have been expended and the regulations are near completion. If the 
right balance is not found, the courts may strike the regulation down. 
To mitigate the potential waste of millions of dollars in promulgating 
rules that will never survive judicial review, economic and 
technological feasibility should be formally scrutinized at the pre-
rule stage of deciding if regulation is appropriate. This Note 
proposes that such a goal can be accomplished by augmenting the 
executive review process through the issuance of a new executive 
order that (1) requires agencies and OIRA to analyze the feasibility 
of all economically significant pre-rule decisions of whether to 
regulate; and (2) lifts the shroud of secrecy surrounding OIRA by 
adding enforceable transparency requirements to the pre-rule review 
process.
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University College of Law, B.S. 2011, Washington State University. The author 
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Preceding nearly every federal action a simple question must 
be asked—how much will this decision cost? In the United States, 
federal adjudication and lawmaking predominantly occurs within 
administrative agencies.1 The volume of legally binding decisions 
issued, cases heard, and people employed by administrative agencies 
dwarf all other branches of government.2 The rules promulgated by 
these agencies significantly impact the daily lives of the nation’s 
citizens, businesses, and economy alike.3 As such, it is hardly 
surprising that the process of administrative rulemaking has been a 
subject of continuous debate.4 A frequent question that has arisen is 
when and how should agencies assess the cost of their regulatory 
actions?5
The regulatory actions of risk managers, like the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), are often subjected to 
more frequent and rigorous scrutiny than other agencies.6 The EPA’s 
mission is “to protect human health and the environment”;7 however, 
compliance with EPA regulations imposes high economic and social 
1. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA F. NOURSE,
STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION 
IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 131 (2014).
2. See id.
3. See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING 
RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE 
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 9 (2008).
4. See id.
5. See id. (discussing the impacts of the debate surrounding cost 
assessment on regulatory policy).
6. See id. at 9-12.
7. Our Mission and What We Do, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do [https://perma.cc/E2XA-
NECT] (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
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costs.8 While the EPA’s rules and regulations have the greatest 
potential for economic and social benefit, its rules also carry the 
highest compliance costs.9
It seems obvious that the proper function of the regulatory state 
requires the cost of implementation and compliance with federal 
regulations to be considered at some point.10 Statutory language may 
instruct agencies to weigh the costs against the benefits,11 but in other 
instances, statutes are silent or ambiguous.12 However, even where 
the statute is silent, Executive Order 12,866 often requires an agency 
to submit an assessment of the costs and benefits of a proposed rule 
for executive review prior to promulgation.13 And, the recent 
decision in Michigan v. EPA demonstrates a lack of consensus 
regarding just how early agencies must weigh costs in the face of 
ambiguity.14
8. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2014
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND 
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 13-14 (2014).
9. See id. An Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review of major 
federal rules from 2003 to 2013 estimated that these rules cost the nation between 
$68.5 and $101.8 billion. Id. at 9-11 (depicting the estimated costs and benefits of 
major federal rules in Table 1-1). Of those costs, 46% to 56% were associated with 
rules issued by the EPA. Id. at 11. 
10. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (“Agencies have long 
treated cost as a centrally relevant factor when deciding whether to regulate.”).
11. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 
1991) (stating § 6 of the Toxic Substance Control Act required the EPA to evaluate 
the costs and benefits of all permissible regulatory regimes for asbestos and choose 
the least burdensome option that would accomplish the desired result).
12. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 220-23 (2009) 
(holding that the requirement that standards for water cooling intake structures be 
achieved by “the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental 
impact” could reasonably allow an evaluation of costs and benefits despite 
ambiguity) (citations omitted).
13. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 638, 644-46 (1994), reprinted in 
5 U.S.C. § 601 at 804-06 (2012) (providing the guidelines for centralized review of 
regulatory actions). The OMB is tasked with the review of costs analysis completed 
by agencies, but there appears to be a lack of consensus concerning the court’s role 
when evaluating those cost–benefit analysis (CBA) during judicial review. Michael 
Abramowicz, Toward a Jurisprudence of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 100 MICH. L. REV.
1708, 1728–29 (2002) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE 
FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002) (critiquing the arguments regarding 
how courts should evaluate CBA during judicial review presented by Cass R. 
Sunstein in his article “On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of 
Agency Action,” 1989 DUKE L.J. 522)).
14. Compare Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2710-12 (holding the EPA acted 
unreasonably by interpreting the statute not to require consideration of costs when 
determining that further regulation was “appropriate and necessary”), with id. at 
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EPA regulations are frequently challenged on the grounds of 
whether the agency properly, or improperly, considered costs during 
the regulatory process.15 In Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,
the Supreme Court held that the EPA is precluded from considering 
costs when emission standards are clearly set on the basis of an
initial health-based risk assessment.16 However, when a statute is 
silent, an agency may be required to weigh costs during its initial 
decision of whether regulations are needed.17 In Michigan v. EPA,
the Court affirmed the latter principle but stopped short of mandating 
a full cost–benefit analysis (CBA) or articulating specific guidelines 
for future analysis.18 The Supreme Court’s decision on February 10, 
2016, to stay implementation of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan 
suggests that the Court is hesitant to allow another economically 
significant rule to be implemented until its legality and fiscal merits 
are settled.19
Executive review—including review of an agency’s CBA—
usually occurs as a proposed rule approaches publication.20 The legal 
community has long debated the merits of applying CBA to 
2725-26 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing it was reasonable to defer consideration of 
costs to later stages of the rulemaking process).
15. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 462-64
(2001) (summarizing respondent’s argument that the EPA should have considered 
the cost of compliance when setting NAAQS standards).
16. See id. at 469, 486 (holding the text of the statute precluded the agency 
from considering costs in the NAAQS setting process). Costs are “both so indirectly 
related to public health and so full of potential for canceling the conclusions drawn 
from direct health effects that it would surely have been expressly mentioned in 
§§ 108 and 109 had Congress meant it to be considered.” Id. at 469. The Supreme 
Court affirmed a more modest reading of American Trucking several years later. See 
Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 223 (“American Trucking thus stands for the rather 
unremarkable proposition that sometimes statutory silence, when viewed in context, 
is best interpreted as limiting agency discretion.”).
17. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2709-12. 
18. Id. at 2711.
19. See Susan E. Dudley, Supreme Court to EPA: Fool Me Once, FORBES 
(Feb. 10, 2016, 8:37 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/susandudley/2016/02/10/ 
supreme-court-to-epa-fool-me-once/#21d3e0825901 [https://perma.cc/4P4J-K536]
(suggesting that the Supreme Court wishes to avoid seeing another major rule 
essentially implemented and then struck down years later).
20. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 638, 638-39 (1994), 
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 802 (2012) (essentially meaning regulatory actions 
with an expected annual economic effect of at least $100 million are subjected to 
rigorous CBA by the enacting agency, which is then reviewed by OMB).
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regulatory actions generally.21 Professor Eric Posner and others have 
extensively discussed the best methodology to apply during the 
review process,22 while others, like Professor Jennifer Nou, have 
evaluated different models of statutorily mandated CBAs.23 In light 
of Michigan v. EPA, the role and timing of a CBA should once again 
be analyzed.
This Note will not discuss whether CBA is a wise or beneficial 
regulatory tool. Rather, it assumes the need for some cost evaluation 
and focuses on the early stages of the regulatory process.24 The 
forthcoming discussion asserts that cost assessment remains 
desirable in furthering the pre-rule phases of the rulemaking, and it 
puts forward the novel proposition that a feasibility standard should 
be uniformly applied to pre-rule decisions.25 When a pre-rule 
regulatory decision is of potentially major proportion, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) should assess the decision in 
accordance with the existing framework of Executive Order 12,866, 
but with a focus on whether sufficient regulation can feasibly be 
achieved.26 By shifting the focus of this pre-rule analysis to the 
question of feasibility, the later development and cost assessment of 
final rules will become more efficient and reliable. However, for 
such a requirement to be effective, a new executive order should 
21. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD 
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993).
22. See generally Matthew D. Alder & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives: A Conference 
Sponsored by the John M. Olin Foundation and the University of Chicago Law 
School: Introduction, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 837, 838-42 (2000) (providing a brief 
summary of how academic discourse surrounding CBA is shifting toward empirical 
and pragmatic assessment of the application of CBA); REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra 
note 3, at 9-12 (discussing perceived problems with the current application of CBA 
to federal rulemaking and proposing a new approach).
23. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential 
Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755 (2013). Indeed, there may be a variety of strategic 
reasons why an agency would choose to perform a formal CBA over less rigorous 
cost assessment, or what level of detail and quality the review will entail. See, e.g.,
Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for 
Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1352 (2002).
24. See infra Part III (discussing the changes to executive review advocated 
by this Note).
25. See infra Subsection III.B.1 (discussing application of a feasibility 
standard to pre-rule agency actions).
26. See infra Section III.A (arguing the requirements of Executive Order 
12,866 should already apply to significant pre-rule actions).
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modify that structure to increase transparency and clarify its 
applicability to pre-rule decisions.27
Part I examines the complex academic discourse regarding 
CBAs, alternative methods of cost assessment, and the approaches 
courts have taken when reviewing agency cost assessment.28 Part II 
discusses the use of executive orders to mandate cost assessment in 
rulemaking, as well as the application of that framework to the 
EPA.29 Part III analyzes the applicability of Executive Order 12,866 
to pre-rule agency actions, and it advocates for a new order that 
clearly requires cost assessment of significant pre-rule decisions and 
greater transparency.30
I. COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS, THE DEFAULT CORNERSTONE OF THE 
REGULATORY PROCESS 
Much ink has been spilled in the last fifty years debating the 
use of policies grounded in neo-classical economics to guide the 
regulation of risks to health, safety, welfare, and even our 
environment.31 Another significant portion of legal scholarship has 
focused on normative questioning of the propriety of CBA in the 
regulatory process.32 However, as presidential acquiescence through 
executive orders and the forthcoming discussion of scholarly work 
27. See infra Subsection III.B.3 (advocating for increased disclosure and 
transparency requirements for OIRA). An essential element of increased 
transparency is a requirement that all communications between the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), executive agencies, and interested 
outside parties concerning significant regulatory actions to be disclosed as they 
occur.
28. Infra Part I (examining existing academic commentary regarding cost 
analysis and prior cases).
29. Infra Part II (discussing the current executive review structure and 
process).
30. Infra Part III (applying a feasibility standard to review of pre-rule 
agency actions).
31. See infra Sections I.A, I.B (discussing work by various prominent 
scholars regarding the ongoing debate surrounding cost analysis of regulatory 
actions).
32. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So 
Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 913 (2000) (taking a position in support of CBA 
against philosophical criticisms); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit 
Analysis in Its Place: Retaking Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335 (2011) 
(engaging normative questions of the propriety of utilizing CBA to decide inherently 
moral questions, such as the valuation of human life). 
1098 Michigan State Law Review 2016
and judicial decisions demonstrate, the contemporary discourse has 
progressed.33
A. The Institutional Role of Cost Assessment
Despite its controversial roots, CBA is an increasingly 
accepted, and even essential, component of the regulatory scheme.34
Academic discourse is now putting greater focus on the institutional 
role of CBA as a regulatory tool.35 However, some argue that the 
federal government’s embrace of CBA has been overly enthusiastic, 
causing it to disregard other tools of cost assessment like feasibility 
standards.36 Coincidentally, as that argument has risen, courts have 
become less deferential to the substance and conclusions of agency 
CBA.37
1. A Nation Embracing the Cost–Benefit Approach 
The actions of nearly every president since Ronald Reagan, the 
day-to-day practice of regulatory agencies and the courts, and the 
growing literature of legal commentators, resoundingly demonstrate 
that the use of CBA is the gold standard of modern regulation.38
Cost–benefit analysis requires, to the extent possible, quantification
and comparison of the expected effects of regulatory action.39 In 
theory, the regulations resulting from CBA applied as a procedure 
33. See infra Section I.A.
34. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF 
REGULATORY PROTECTION 19-20 (2002); Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-
Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 323-24 (2001).
35. See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A 
Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1140-42 (2001)
(laying the foundation for a theory of CBA as a means for the executive to control 
the actions of regulatory agencies).
36. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, 
Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and 
Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2005) (presenting the 
argument that the focus on CBA has erroneously overshadowed other viable cost 
assessment approaches such as technology-based feasibility standards).
37. See Posner, supra note 35, at 1137-38.
38. Compare SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 19-20 (making the case for 
widespread use of CBA but noting that as of 2002, it did not yet command complete 
social consensus as proper), with REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 3, at 12-13
(accepting CBA as an “inevitable, but also . . . desirable” part of the regulatory 
process while laying the foundation for reforms in procedure and substance).
39. SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 20. These effects are broadly grouped into 
the categories of costs and benefits. Id.
Rethinking Executive Review 1099
and followed in substance—that benefits must outweigh costs—will 
be economically and socially efficient.40 The CBA method is
attractive to politicians and regulators alike because it provides 
transparency, logic, and a measure of accountability to regulatory 
decisions.41 These principles do not, however, dictate when cost 
assessment should begin or its institutional role in the modern 
regulatory state.42
2. Cost–Benefit Analysis and Executive Review as a Means of 
Control
The use of CBA is most often praised as a means of ensuring 
efficiency of regulatory action; however, some argue the true 
purpose is to exert power over executive agencies.43 A control theory 
is particularly relevant because the delegation of lawmaking 
authority to federal agencies represents a willing discharge of control 
over the regulatory agenda.44 Control is created by giving the 
executive a means of blocking projects that are not in line with its 
own policy objectives, and it helps to decrease asymmetry in 
information and increase control of the agenda.45 Therefore, CBA is 
likely to improve the efficiency of the final policy and regulatory 
results along a range of possible outcomes, even if the agency and 
president do not share common objectives.46 Professor Posner, a key 
40. Id. at 20-21. “For most government action . . . the benefits do seem to 
exceed the costs. . . . But . . . a closer look at federal regulatory policy shows a wide 
range of problems[,] . . . [the] foremost is exceptionally poor priority setting, with 
substantial resources sometimes going to small problems, and with little attention to 
some serious problems.” Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1658 (2001).
41. SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 27-28.
42. See id.
43. See, e.g., Nou, supra note 23, at 1758 (arguing executive review 
through OIRA provides a means by which the president can influence agency 
rulemaking, but may lead to agencies defensively insulating their reports); Posner, 
supra note 35, at 1140-41 (arguing the CBA’s are more accurately described as a 
means by which the president and Congress can control executive agencies). 
44. See Posner, supra note 35, at 1142-43.
45. Id. at 1143.
46. See id. at 1162. This author utilized an equation of positive political 
theory to test a variety of possible policy outcomes regarding whether an agency 
would choose to utilize a CBA and how likely that analysis was to encourage 
acceptance by the executive. See id. at 1147-62. Factors such as the executive’s 
desire for an efficient outcome, the accuracy of CBA, and the costs of performing 
CBA were considered. Id. at 1162. The author concluded that the final outcome 
utilizing a CBA was always more efficient than without, unless (1) CBA was 
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proponent of the control theory, accepts and supports CBA but 
acknowledges that it may not always lead to the most efficient 
regulations.47
Professor Posner suggests that a preferable role for generalist 
courts would be to enhance the value of CBA by focusing on 
performance as a procedural matter, rather than scrutinizing the 
substance.48 He offers several justifications, most of which tend to 
resonate with those explanations used to support deference to an 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of statutory ambiguity.49 A more 
hands-off approach for the courts maintains the prevalence of CBA 
as the gold standard for regulatory review, but restricts the judiciary 
to a gatekeeper abstaining from scrutinizing the substance of a rule.50
However, giving the executive primary authority over agency 
cost assessments also carries risks, which are heightened when 
agency staff and the executive do not share policy objectives.51
Executive review by the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA)—a subdivision of the OMB—may not carry the 
same finality as a judicial decision, but rejection can still be very 
assumed inaccurate and expensive; or (2) CBA is highly accurate, but the president 
is more interventionist than is efficient. Id. The value of CBA is at its highest when 
the goals of the executive and Congress are in sync, while judicial enforcement is 
most valuable when the executive’s policy objectives are also efficient. See id. at 
1188-89. The author provided the following guiding principles stating that CBA 
becomes more desirable as:
(1) The agency goals diverge from the principal’s;
(2) The principal’s goal approximates efficiency; or it is less interventionist, 
or not too much more interventionist, than efficiency (if cost-benefit analysis 
is judicially enforced or if it serves as a precise signal);
(3) The goals of components of the principal—the President, members 
of Congress—converge;
(4) The regulated activity can be reliably monetized;
(5) The difficulty of monitoring the agency increases;
(6) The difficulty of sanctioning the agency or agency head declines.
Id. at 1189.
47. Id. at 1143.
48. See id. at 1192.
49. See id. at 1193. The primary justifications for the preference the court 
take a procedural rather than substantive stance on review can be summarized as 
follows: (1) Courts lack specialized expertise needed to independently determine 
valuation and discount rates; (2) demanding that agencies monetize unquantifiable 
costs or benefits is not desirable; (3) the ideal policy outcome of the agency and the 
principle help determine the level of scrutiny; and (4) the greater the political 
branch’s ability to sanction the agency the less eager courts should be to punish or 
reverse agency decisions. See id.
50. See id.
51. See generally Nou, supra note 23.
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costly and time consuming.52 That agencies may intentionally 
insulate their regulatory actions from reversal by the judiciary is 
hardly surprising; however, evidence suggests agencies engage in 
similar insular actions in preparation for executive review.53
Decisions made to insulate regulatory action can drastically alter the 
detail, substance, and value of a CBA.54
Because OIRA can effectively reverse or postpone a proposed 
rule by returning it to agencies for further consideration, executive 
review is taken very seriously.55 Self-insulation, if misused, has the 
potential to undermine the value of any form of cost assessment.56 In 
fact, an agency can utilize a number of strategies to “pad” its 
findings and regulatory decisions in order to survive review, some of 
which may avoid or influence agency cost assessment.57 Self-
insulation can force the resource-limited executive office to pick and 
52. See id. at 1758-59. The routine nature of executive review in rule 
promulgation also allows for it to be planned for, and agency reports and 
documentation to be catered to that review process. Id. at 1759.
53. See id. at 1757-58 (proposing that because agencies often face review 
by the executive before judicial review is even contemplated, those agencies 
consciously plan for survival of such review).
54. See id. at 1770 (“Administrative agencies are bureaucracies as 
traditionally conceived, and such bureaucracies have long been known to create 
routines and strategies for dealing with new requirements imposed upon them.”).
55. See id. at 1778. If the agency’s policy objectives are contrary to those of 
the current administration, it may decide to avoid intensive cost review all together 
by issuing policy statements or guidance documents that do not carry the binding 
force of a formal rule. See id. at 1777. Guidance documents and policy statements 
that are not expected to lead to the promulgation of a formal rule are not subject to 
Executive Order (EO) 12,866. See id. at 1785-86, 1789. Such action may carry the 
risk of pushing a significant amount of agency policy work behind closed doors.
56. See id. at 1771.
57. See id. at 1782. Methods to bypass review under EO 12,866 include 
(1) regulatory inaction; (2) adjudication and guidance documents; and (3) 
promulgation of numerous nonsignificant rules. See id. at 1783-86. An agency can 
calibrate the scrutiny of review by attempting to avoid designation as economically 
significant rules. Id. at 1792. However, recognizing what a CBA consists of is open 
to multiple interpretations, the agency can also decide to vary the quality and 
technical nature of its analysis and presentation, thereby making review by a non-
expert more difficult. See id. at 1792-93. Since some courts have held that the 
executive review process cannot delay promulgation, agencies can used the 
timelines imposed by EO 12,866 and the organic statute to force speedy and less 
thorough review. See id. at 1797-98, nn. 232-36. However, guidance documents are 
now subject to the same requirements as other regulatory actions, including the 
requirements for significant actions. See generally Exec. Order. No. 13,422, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007) (amending EO 12,866 to include guidance documents to 
existing executive review requirements).
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choose which regulatory actions to invest time and money into 
reviewing.58 Whatever form regulatory action takes, the proper role 
of courts in reviewing the final product may depend on the judge’s 
opinion regarding the legitimacy of executive oversight.59 But most 
generally agree that some form of judicial scrutiny is necessary.60
That being said, the traditional CBA is just one of several possible 
balancing and feasibility based approaches for assessing costs.61
3. Alternatives to the Traditional Cost–Benefit Approach
A potentially undesirable result of governmental endorsement 
of the CBA approach is that some believe such analysis is inherently 
anti-regulatory.62 While it seems unlikely that the prevalence of CBA 
will disappear in the foreseeable future, the approach may be 
improved or supplemented.63 One alternative theory is highly critical 
of the current structure and application of CBA, but does not attempt 
to disperse with the method altogether.64
Professors Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore argue that 
CBA, as currently structured and applied to environmental law, is 
biased toward conservative anti-regulatory interests.65 The book 
Retaking Rationality presents many perceived problems with CBA 
and OIRA, largely focusing on the assumptions and metrics 
58. See Nou, supra note 23, at 1772.
59. See id. at 1822-23. The author notes that while there is a range of 
possibilities between those who are always for or always against critical judicial 
review of agency decisions, and the appropriate level of scrutiny should be made on 
a case-by-case basis after considering the degree of agency self-insulation and 
presidential involvement. Id. at 1823.
60. See, e.g., id. at 1822-23.
61. See infra Subsection I.A.3 (discussing modified CBA and feasibility 
standards).
62. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 3, at 13-15 (summarizing several 
criticisms of CBA).
63. Id. at 171 (proposing changes to executive review that will help to cure 
perceived deficiencies in the current process).
64. See generally id. (advocating for fundamental alteration to the role of 
CBA in the regulatory scheme). The author argues that CBA is likely a permanent 
mechanism in the regulatory process, but it does not have to be a negative for pro-
regulatory interests or the environment. See id. at 9-16. The author presents eight 
chapters dedicated to critiques or fallacies institutionalized within the current use of 
CBA, see id. at 51, 55-147, as well as institutionalized hurdles to its effective 
application as a regulatory tool, see id. at 151-61.
65. See id. at 47.
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applied.66 Accordingly, the proponents suggest a new executive order 
to shift OIRA away from critical review of cost assessment “toward 
agenda-setting and . . . calibrat[ing] . . . regulatory stringency.”67
Two suggestions presented are of particular interest: the formal 
adoption of open meeting requirements and the inclusion of public 
disclosure requirements for OIRA’s internal rules.68 While a 
paradigm shift of the kind suggested is unlikely to occur within the 
foreseeable future, some suggestions may prove useful for improving 
the current system.69
CBA is not the only legitimate mechanism for regulatory cost 
assessment, and other methods, such as feasibility base standards, 
should be utilized more.70 The feasibility principle is most often 
associated with technology-based environmental or occupational 
safety standards and requires highly stringent regulations to the 
extent “feasible.”71 A feasibility analysis requires an initial 
assessment of the cost of implementing a proposed regulatory action 
based on the technology available to comply.72 Next, those costs are 
compared to the past and expected profits of the industry subject to 
66. See id. at 55. Some of the perceived problems with the current system 
are broadly labeled as a false assumption that unintended consequences are always 
bad, id., critiques regarding the propriety of wealth preservation, id. at 67, and 
metrics of valuing human life, id. at 77, 107, and false assumptions regarding the 
adaptability of people and industry, id. at 85, 131. 
67. Id. at 171. Shortly after its publication, Rethinking Rationality received 
critical review from legal scholars on the opposing side of the debate. See, e.g.,
Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Revesz & Livermore, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 877 (2010) (reviewing RICHARD R. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE,
RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE 
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008)). This review largely criticized the book for 
over simplifying complex issues and promoting individual political agendas at the 
sacrifice of academic objectivity. See id. at 911-12. 
68. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 3, at 172-73.
69. See id. Whether or not the all of the changes proposed by Revesz are 
needed, the author’s theory provides much needed critical analysis of the current 
executive review process.
70. See generally Driesen, supra note 36 (presenting a normative 
comparison of a feasibility principle and CBA and arguing that feasibility provides a 
reasonable alternative for CBA in many regulatory contexts).
71. See DAVID M. DRIESEN, ROBERT W. ALDER & KIRSTEN H. ENGEL,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A CONCEPTUAL AND PRAGMATIC APPROACH 185 (Vicki Been 
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011).
72. See Driesen, supra note 36, at 10-11. The feasibility principle as applied 
to environmental regulations is constrained by the following principles: “First, the 
principle authorizes government agencies to forego physically impossible 
environmental improvements. Second, the principle authorizes government agencies 
to forego constraints so costly that they cause widespread plant shutdowns.” Id. at 9.
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regulation.73 If the costs of the proposed regulation will lead to mass 
unprofitability in the industry or widespread shutdowns and job loss, 
then the regulatory action is deemed unfeasible.74 If the proposed 
regulatory action is unfeasible, then it should be abandoned or 
materially altered.75
Many statutes expressly require a feasibility approach for 
promulgating regulations,76 but the principles of a feasibility analysis 
could be applied as a supplemental tool for executive review. For 
example, the feasibility standard would give agencies greater 
guidance during early pre-rule decisions when the data needed to 
fully quantify benefits is limited or not yet available.77 Moreover, 
historic application of feasibility nearly always results in proposed 
regulation that will result in zero facility closures,78 which may make 
this approach politically attractive. Even if a full CBA is still 
required at later stages of rule promulgation, a feasibility standard 
provides a reasonable means of gauging the costs of possible 
regulatory solutions during pre-rule stages because it does not 
require monetization of benefits.79 While the feasibility approach has 
received far less support from Congress recently, with the increasing 
73. See id. at 12 (“This implies that regulators must compare cost, not to 
benefits, but to net earnings prior to regulation and the value of corporate assets. 
Costs significant enough to render plants unprofitable could lead their owners to 
shut them down.”). 
74. See id. at 16 (“This principle requires maximum reductions at least up 
to the point where plant closures begin to occur.”).
75. Id. at 18.
76. See id. at 20-21 (describing provisions of the Clean Air Act and Clean 
Water Act that call for standards to be set using technology based feasibility 
principles).
77. Id. at 41-42. 
78. See id. at 45-46 (“[The] EPA has regularly refrained from regulating at 
all and engaged in quite indefensible statutory interpretation to avoid shutdowns 
under health-based statutory provisions that seemed to require shutdowns . . . to 
fully protect public health.”). The feasibility principle operates on a presumption 
that regulations that are so burdensome as to result in widespread closures will not 
be deemed feasible. See id. at 46 (“Any time an agency predicts that its regulation 
will cause widespread closure of facilities, it will face enormous pressure to soften 
that regulation.”).
79. See id. at 51. Analyzing benefits is commonly understood to require 
quantification of “the value of the averted harm from the decrease in [the risks] the 
particular regulation will bring.” Id.
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hostility of courts toward agency CBAs, a change in opinion may be 
approaching.80
B. Increased Scrutiny in the Courts
Many statutes do not formally require CBA;81 however, as most 
agencies engage in cost analysis for one reason or another, courts 
consistently look at those findings.82 Executive Order 12,866 
essentially forces agencies to assess costs and benefits in order to 
gain OIRA approval in situations where they might not otherwise.83
The CBA submitted to OIRA is not independently enforceable84 but 
is usually incorporated into the agency’s reasoning and published
with the final rule. In the past, federal courts were fairly deferential 
to an agency’s conclusion in reviewing its CBA,85 but more recently 
agencies have been subjected to increasingly rigorous review.86 The 
following cases provide insight regarding the treatment of CBA by 
courts and how pre-rule assessment may help a rule survive review.87
80. See id. at 94-95 (concluding that current proponents of the CBA 
approach have failed to articulate a sound reason why it should be preferred over 
feasibility as the primary method for cost assessment).
81. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2012) (requiring standards for new or 
existing sources to meet the maximum degree of emissions reduction if achievable 
by that categorical source of emissions after considering the cost of compliance, but 
without requiring a comparison to benefits).
82. See infra Subsections I.B.1-3 (analyzing three different ways in which 
courts have evaluated agency cost analysis).
83. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 638, 644-46 (1994), reprinted 
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 804-06 (2012).
84. See id. § 10, 3 C.F.R. at 649 (clarifying that the executive order does 
not create an independent private right of action). 
85. See Peter Raven-Hansen, Making Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial 
Review of Agency Violations of Executive Order 12,291, 1983 DUKE L.J. 285, 340, 
340 n.309 (1983) (noting the deferential nature of many courts’ review of agency 
cost–benefit analysis); Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use 
Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1288-89 (2009) (“In other contexts involving 
economic regulations, courts rarely interfere to second-guess those cost-benefit 
determinations.”).
86. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (subjecting the CBA performed by the SEC to highly critical review and 
ultimately vacating the finalized rule). 
87. See infra Subsections I.B.1-3 (analyzing three different ways in which 
courts have evaluated agency cost analysis).
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1. Statutory Preclusion of Analyzing Costs
Statutes delegating lawmaking power to an agency may 
prohibit weighing costs, and in such cases, Executive Order 12,866 
cannot legally impose such a requirement.88 Section 109 of the Clean 
Air Act (CAA) contains such a restriction.89 In Whitman v. American 
Trucking, the Court held that the CAA precluded consideration of 
costs during promulgation of rules under a health-based risk 
assessment.90 One of several issues in that case was whether § 109 of 
the CAA precluded the EPA from weighing the costs of 
implementation in setting or revising the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS).91 Noting that in many parallel 
provisions of the CAA Congress explicitly addressed whether the 
EPA was to consider costs when promulgating standards, the Court 
refused to read into § 109 an implicit authorization to weigh costs.92
Key to the Court’s reasoning was the focus of § 109 on setting 
NAAQS based on the EPA’s findings regarding public health risks.93
Supporting the textual analysis was the Court’s conclusion that 
Congress was aware of high compliance costs when it enacted the 
CAA and specifically omitted cost consideration from § 109.94
American Trucking affirmed the D.C. Circuit’s prior judgment 
that the EPA was not permitted to weigh costs of implementation 
when setting NAAQS, even if such economic considerations will 
88. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 at 802 (2012) (“[A]gencies should adhere to the following principles, 
to the extent permitted by law. . . .”); Id. § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. at 640 (“To the extent 
permitted by law, OMB shall provide guidance to agencies and . . . shall be the 
entity that reviews individual regulations, as provided by this Executive order.”).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)-(2) (2012).
90. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 462, 465 (2001).
91. Id. at 464-65. EPA’s standing interpretation of section 109 was that cost 
considerations were precluded in setting NAAQS or revising those standards. 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,887 
(July 18, 1997). The action was identified as economically significant under 
Executive Order 12,866. Id. Therefore, the EPA completed a regulatory impact 
analysis, including a CBA, for potential state implementation plans under the 
NAAQS, but those considerations did not play a role in setting the standards. Id.
92. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 468-69. Justice Scalia, writing the opinion 
for the court, famously noted Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not . . . hide 
elephants in mouseholes.” Id. at 468.
93. See id. at 471.
94. See id. at 466-67.
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become relevant during state implementation.95 Thus, when a statute 
expressly requires an agency to establish standards under a method 
incompatible with cost assessment, the existing executive order 
cannot legally impose one.96 However, as later cases demonstrated, 
the Court does not always treat silence regarding costs the same.97
2. Hard-Look Review of Cost Analysis
When agencies are required to consider costs, courts—most 
often the D.C. Circuit—have become increasingly rigorous in 
reviewing agencies’ CBA under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).98 One example of hard-look review comes from a case where 
the Securities and Exchange Commission—exempt from CBA under 
Executive Order 12,866 at the time—was statutorily required to 
weigh the costs and benefits of new proxy rules.99 In Business 
Roundtable v. SEC, petitioners challenged the SEC’s promulgation 
of Rule 14a-11,100 which revised the requirements public companies 
must meet when informing shareholders about and their ability to 
vote for shareholder-nominated candidates for a board of directors.101
Before this rule, incumbent board members would nominate 
candidates for vacant seats, and those nominations would be sent in a 
proxy statement to the shareholders.102 Under the new rule, it was 
95. See id.
96. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 
38,882. Executive Order 12,866 only requires assessment of costs “to the extent 
permitted by law.” Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), 
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 801 (2012).
97. See infra Subsection I.B.3 (discussing the recent Supreme Court 
decision in Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015)).
98. See generally Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(providing a critical analysis of the SEC’s CBA of a new rule changing the 
requirements for proxy-contest board elections and ultimately holding the analysis 
inadequate, arbitrary, and capricious).
99. Id. At the time of the Business Roundtable case, Executive Order 
12,866 did not apply to independent regulatory agencies such as the SEC. See Exec. 
Order No. 12,866 § 3(d), 3 C.F.R. at 641.
100. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1146.
101. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 
56,668, 56,670 (Sept. 16, 2010).
102. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1147.
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significantly more difficult for shareholders to nominate 
candidates.103
The challengers primarily argued, and the court noted, that the 
rule was flawed because the SEC inadequately carried out its duty to 
evaluate the effect of a new rule “upon ‘efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation’ and . . . ‘to apprise itself . . . of the economic 
consequences of [the] proposed regulation.’” under Title XV.104
While not binding, courts have generally been deferential to the 
factual findings of agencies and OIRA during CBA review.105
However, the D.C. Circuit was highly critical, and it found the 
agency’s CBA arbitrary and inadequate.106
The opinion amounted to a scathing review of the SEC 
Commissioner’s factual determinations and ultimately vacated the 
rule.107 Giving the SEC scant deference, the court dissected 
everything from the assumptions and discounting methods applied to 
what studies were and were not relied upon by the agency.108 The 
103. See id. To nominate a candidate shareholders were required to 
separately file a proxy statement and ensure its distribution to the board and all other 
shareholders. Id.
104. Id. at 1148 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012)) (internal citation 
omitted). 
105. See, e.g., Fla. Manufactured Hous. Ass’n v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 
1577 (11th Cir. 1995) (deferring to the agency’s methodological choices with regard 
to cost assessment under and ambiguous statute); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 
F.2d 1336, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that agency decisions about CBA are of a 
nature where the court should prefer to defer to agency expertise).
106. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148-55. On petition, the D.C. Circuit 
analyzed the final rule under the arbitrary and capricious standard of APA § 706. Id. 
at 1148.
107. See id. at 1156.
108. See id. at 1150-51. First, the proposition that directors may not choose 
to oppose shareholder nominees was based on mere speculation and contrary to 
evidence of record with regard to the fiduciary obligations of the board. Id. at 1149-
50. Second, the Commissioner neglected its statutory duty when it failed to use 
available data about the costs of traditional proxy contests to make predictions 
concerning how much a company may spend to oppose shareholder nominees. Id. at 
1150. Third, the court doubted the studies relied upon to support the assertion that 
boards with dissident directors would actually increase performance for the 
company, and it scolded SEC for failing to adequately address studies predicting the 
opposite result submitted by commentators. Id. at 1151. Finally, the decision to 
discount costs over time, but not benefits, was deemed arbitrary and unsupported by 
the record. Id. The court was also critical of the Commissioner’s failure to 
adequately address the possible effects and costs of shareholders being represented 
by special interest groups that might funnel money into proxy contests. Id. at 1151-
52. Additionally, dismissing the possible effects of increased volume or frequency 
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opinion in Business Roundtable illustrates what some deem to be an 
undesirable consequence of judges second-guessing the well-
articulated findings of agency experts.109 However, if the SEC’s cost 
analysis had first been subjected to the scrutiny of OIRA prior to 
promulgation, then perhaps the rule, and the outcome of the case, 
would have been different.110 Often, even if a statute is silent with 
regard to cost consideration, a court may interpret the statute to 
require agencies to engage in some form of cost assessment.111
3. Statutory Silence as Requiring Cost Consideration
In 2015, the Supreme Court reprimanded the EPA for refusing 
to consider costs when deciding whether further regulation of certain 
power plants was “appropriate and necessary” under § 112 of the 
CAA.112 The EPA extensively evaluated the costs and benefits of the 
proposed and final rule in a “Regulatory Impact Analysis” (RIA) in 
accordance with Executive Order 12,866.113 However, the majority 
took issue with the agency’s failure to consider costs at all when 
making its pre-rule decision in 2000 that regulations were 
appropriate and necessary.114
of proxy contests on company performance without reasonable explanation was 
arbitrary. Id. at 1153-55.
109. See, e.g., Garrett F. Bishop & Michael A. Coffee, A Tale of Two 
Commissions: A Compendium of the Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirements Faced by 
the SEC & CFTC, 32 REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 565, 595-98 (2013) (summarizing 
the highly critical nature of the D.C. Circuit’s review in Business Roundtable v. 
SEC).
110. See, e.g., Fla. Manufactured Hous. Ass’n v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 
1578-81 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding in favor of the agency and deferring to its 
assumptions and findings in the CBA conducted as a part of executive review).
111. See infra Subsection I.B.3.
112. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015) (holding that EPA 
acted unreasonably when it refused to consider costs of compliance when deciding 
further regulation of power plants was appropriate and necessary after conducting 
congressionally mandated studies). The specific provision the agency acted under 
was 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). Id. 
113. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 76 Fed. Reg. 
24,976, 25,078-79 (proposed May 3, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pts. 60 & 63); 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 
9432-33 (2012). 
114. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2708-09. See also 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,988 (“We 
further interpret the term ‘appropriate’ to not allow for the consideration of costs.”); 
77 Fed. Reg. at 9,327 (“Cost does not have to be read into the definition of 
‘appropriate’ . . . .”).
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The CAA contains a unique provision for determining if 
NAAQS apply to fossil-fuel-fired power plants, and it was the EPA’s 
interpretation of this provision that gave rise to litigation.115 First, 
Congress required the EPA to study the hazards to public health 
reasonably anticipated to occur after the implementation of other 
regulations under the 1990 CAA amendments.116 After consideration 
of those studies, the EPA determined that regulation was 
“appropriate and necessary,” thus requiring the agency to regulate 
the power plants.117 The agency reaffirmed this finding in 2012 and 
began rule promulgation.118 The EPA sent a RIA to OIRA along with 
the published notice of the agency’s 2012 determination.119 As the 
115. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
116. Id. The statute required the EPA to perform three separate studies of 
coal and oil fired power plants. Id. at 2708. One required a study of “the health and 
environmental effects of [mercury] emissions, technologies which are available to 
control such emissions, and the costs of such technologies.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7412(n)(1)(B) (2012)).
117. See id. at 2705. The agency’s 2000 findings regarding the appropriate 
and necessary determination were published in 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,826-30 
(Dec. 20, 2000). This initial finding was reviewed by OIRA in accordance with 
Executive Order 12,866. Id. at 79,831. However, the EPA’s findings were not 
deemed economically significant nor did OIRA publish its findings in the Unified 
Agenda for that term. See OIRA Conclusion of EO 12,866 Regulatory Review,
OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ 
eoDetails?rrid=107185 [https://perma.cc/4W3P-VJ52] (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) 
(presenting the regulatory review for EPA’s 2000 “Regulatory Finding on the 
Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utility Steam Generating 
Units”).
118. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705. “The Agency found regulation 
‘appropriate’ because (1) power plants’ emissions of mercury and other hazardous 
air pollutants posed risks to human health and the environment and (2) controls were 
available to reduce these emissions.” Id. Further, regulations were deemed 
“‘necessary’ because the imposition of the Act’s other requirements did not 
eliminate these risks.” Id.
119. See id. at 2705-06. The dissent notes that this review was a formal 
CBA. Id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The initial findings by the EPA with regard 
to the appropriate and necessary decision in 2000 were not reviewed as an 
“Economically Significant” rule or action, and thus OIRA would not have reviewed 
the findings and any associated CBA with the same degree of scrutiny as it would 
have otherwise. OIRA has minimal records of the first review. See, e.g., OIRA 
Conclusion of EO 12,866 Regulatory Review, supra note 117. The formal CBA was 
not completed and reviewed until 2011, and the final rule was published in 2012. 
See View Rule, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201110&RIN=2060-AP52 [https:// perma.cc/L836-
A8ZZ] (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (summary of executive review findings for EPA’s 
“National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-
Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for 
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EPA noted in the Federal Register, and presumably its report to 
OIRA, the quantifiable impacts of the rules were expected to be $9.6 
billion in annual costs and $4 to $6 million in direct benefits.120
However, ancillary benefits121 were expected to raise the benefit 
threshold to $37 to $90 billion.122 Despite the extensive data 
available regarding costs, the EPA determined cost consideration 
was not necessary to its appropriate and necessary finding, and it did 
not base that decision on the cost factors discussed in the RIA.123
Even under the deferential standard of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,124 the Court held the EPA’s 
refusal to consider costs when making the preliminary appropriate 
and necessary finding was unreasonable.125 Justice Scalia, writing for 
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units”). It is curious that the original agency 
finding that regulations were “appropriate and necessary” was not itself subject to a 
formal CBA review under EO 12,866. The mere speculation of a lay person could 
likely surmise that nearly all emission regulations imposed on the energy sector 
would be likely to have an economic impact of at least $100 million per year, and 
the executive order is not limited to actual rules, but rather includes a much wider 
array of agency actions that are expected to result in the promulgation of a rule.
120. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705-06. Despite the disclosure 
requirements of EO 12,866, the regulatory impact analysis was unavailable in a 
downloadable pdf or html format from either the EPA’s or OIRA’s online databases.
121. Direct benefits are those benefits that are intended results of a program 
and closely related to the regulatory measure being taken. Vocabulary Catalog: 




direct%20benefit&filterMatchCriteria=Contains [https:// perma.cc/NH3U-N3VU] 
(follow “Search” hyperlink; then search “direct benefit”). Alternatively, indirect, or 
ancillary, benefits are those that arise from and are related to the regulatory program, 
but are not an intended objective or goal of the program. Id. (follow “Search” 
hyperlink; then search “indirect benefit”).
122. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705-06. 
123. Id.
124. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under 
Chevron once it is determined that Congress has not spoken to the precise issue that 
the agency is addressing in its interpretation of the law, the Court will defer to the 
agency’s reasonable interpretation so long as it is not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 
842-44.
125. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711. The EPA attempted to support its 
interpretation by invoking American Trucking. Id. at 2709. Under the EPA’s 
interpretation, the agency was precluded from inferring mandatory cost 
consideration from a provision of the CAA silent in that regard. See id. This is an 
interesting point for the Court to make as Justice Scalia—writing for the majority in 
American Trucking—used the exact same argument to buttress his conclusion that 
the EPA was precluded from considering economic costs when setting NAAQS. 
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the majority, stated that the term “appropriate” naturally “include[d] 
consideration of all the relevant factors” and that agencies have long 
considered weighing of advantages and disadvantages of proposed 
actions as a central part of the rulemaking.126 Particularly damaging 
to the EPA’s interpretation was that one preliminary study required 
by Congress expressly included consideration of the cost of available 
control technologies.127 The agency’s extensive cost consideration at 
later stages of promulgation did not forgive or repair the 
unreasonable neglect in failing to weigh those factors initially.128
While the Court stopped short of mandating a formal CBA for the 
preliminary determination of whether to regulate,129 some level of 
quantified cost consideration is necessary to survive future review.130
Alternatively, a robust dissenting opinion argued that it was 
reasonable and appropriate to defer consideration of costs to later 
stages of rulemaking.131 The dissent found it unlikely that the EPA 
could estimate costs with any degree of accuracy at the preliminary 
stage, and the later processes of rulemaking were expected to ensure 
Justice Scalia distinguished American Trucking by concluding that the provision in 
question there expressly encompassed health and safety concerns. If the CAA 
expressly “directs [the] EPA to regulate on the basis of a factor that on its face does 
not include cost,” then an implicit requirement should usually not be read into it. Id. 
This provision of the CAA did not direct the EPA to regulate on the basis of factors 
that clearly precluded cost consideration. Id.
126. See id. at 2707-08 (quoting White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 
748 F.3d 122, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). “[C]ost includes more than the expense of 
complying with regulations; any disadvantage could be termed a cost.” Id. at 2707. 
EPA conceded that even if it had determined that the technologies needed to 
eliminate harms from emissions “do even more harm to human health, it would still
deem regulation appropriate.” Id.
127. See id. at 2708.
128. See id. at 2709. Even if costs would again become relevant and be 
considered when determining at what level to set regulations, they do not affect the 
need to consider costs during the preliminary phase of deciding whether to regulate. 
Id.
129. See id. at 2711 (holding that the agency may not ignore costs altogether, 
but that the agency must monetize each potential advantage and disadvantage when 
making the preliminary determination of whether additional regulation is 
appropriate and necessary). 
130. See id. While both costs and benefits, including ancillary benefits, were 
monetized to a significant degree in the regulatory impact analysis, the EPA itself
conceded that it did not rely on those estimates in making its preliminary 
determination. Id. Accordingly, even if permissible, those considerations do not 
make up for the agency’s neglect because the Court reviews what the agency 
actually “did, not by what it might have done.” Id. (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 
318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943)). 
131. See id. at 2714-15 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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costs were given ample consideration.132 In 2000, the agency
expressly noted that a thorough evaluation of alternative regulatory 
schemes would be explored to find a lowest cost solution during the 
writing of the rule.133 Thus, the dissent asserted that it was adequate 
that the initial determination to regulate be based on health risks and 
technological feasibility.134 Moreover, the dissent suggested that 
because the agency knew any proposed rule would need to pass 
critical economic review by OIRA, the lack of cost consideration in 
the initial decision was irrelevant to the overall validity and 
efficiency of the final rule.135
As pre-promulgation executive review continues to move 
toward acceptance as a bedrock aspect of the regulatory process, the 
closer scrutiny of the review process’ inner workings is necessary.136
Executive review proves to be an important means by which the 
work of agencies can be monitored and guided.137 Moreover, it helps 
132. Id. Justice Kagan argued the determination of whether to regulate is 
similar to the health-based trigger used for setting NAAQS; under this theory, 
deciding to regulate is based solely on the quantity of pollutants and their health 
effects, and costs consideration is reserved for later. See id. at 2715. 
133. Id. at 2717.
134. See id. Note, however, technological feasibility still requires 
consideration of whether the costs of implementation and compliance would 
bankrupt the industry. See Driesen, supra note 36, at 11-12. EPA did not phrase its 
findings in terms of feasibility, rather it stated that consideration of costs carried no 
relevance to its “appropriate and necessary” finding. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707. 
See also National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 76 Fed. Reg. 
24,976, 24,988 (proposed May 3, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63) 
(“We further interpret the term ‘appropriate’ to not allow for the consideration of 
costs.”); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 77 Fed. Reg. 
9304, 9327 (proposed Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63) (“Cost 
does not have to be read into the definition of ‘appropriate.’”).
135. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2721 (Kagan, J., dissenting). To summarize 
the dissent’s analysis, as a whole the agency’s interpretation was reasonable because 
it did consider costs in several ways: (1) it divided power plants into subcategories 
based on factors such as fuel type, size, geographic location, and technology; and 
(2) the floor standards were designed to reflect what the top 12% in each category 
were already achieving, thus, being technology forcing while still feasible and 
economically sound. Id. at 2718-20.
136. See supra Section I.A; see also REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 3, at 
9 (advocating for fundamental alteration to the role of OIRA and the use of CBA in 
the regulatory scheme).
137. See supra Subsection I.A.2; see also Nou, supra note 23, at 1814 
(arguing executive review through OIRA provides a means by which the president 
can influence agency rulemaking, but may lead to agencies defensively insulating 
their reports); Posner, supra note 35, at 1140-41 (arguing the CBA’s are more 
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to establish a more substantial record to be relied upon when 
litigation arises, which can be useful in light of increasing judicial 
scrutiny.138 However, perhaps surprisingly, the framework that 
mandates and guides agencies and OIRA through the review process 
has remained largely unchanged over the last several decades.139
II. THE RISE OF COST ANALYSIS IN FEDERAL RULEMAKING
Weighing the costs and benefits of federal regulations before 
they become law is not a recent development and examples date back 
at least to the 1936 Flood Control Act of the New Deal Era.140 In the 
past, risk managers, such as the EPA and the Occupational Health 
and Safety Administration, were the primary targets of such 
mandates.141 However, today, even the actions of financial regulatory 
institutions are subject to a rigorous evaluation of projected costs and 
benefits.142 While formal CBA is not the only means by which an 
agency can evaluate the value and efficiency of proposed rules, CBA 
has become the default method.143
A. Cost–Benefit Analysis and the Regulatory Process
Since its enactment in 1946, the APA has required that 
agencies publish a description of the basis and purpose of all 
proposed regulations to facilitate review by the judiciary and 
political superiors.144 However, with its lack of quantifiable metrics, 
the APA provides an unsatisfactory means for those entities to 
measure the social value of proposed regulations or the best time to 
accurately described as a means by which the president and Congress can control 
executive agencies).
138. See supra Section I.B (discussing various cases demonstrating the 
evolving level of deference courts have given agencies’ review of costs and other 
factors when promulgating regulations).
139. See infra Section II.A (discussing the history and framework of 
executive review).
140. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis,
109 YALE L.J. 165, 169 (1999); Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: Toward a Framework of Function(s) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1983, 1994 (2013).
141. See Ahdieh, supra note 140, at 1994. 
142. See Bishop & Coffee, supra note 109, at 586.
143. See supra Subsection I.A.3.
144. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2012)).
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begin review.145 The inability of the APA process to measure social 
and economic value is likely one reason the executive began 
requiring CBA in the regulatory process.
While the APA does not require CBA, it does provide the 
general framework for notice-and-comment rulemaking, which is the 
most common procedure for promulgating rules and regulations.146
Federal statutes delegate lawmaking authority to agencies; and 
through that authority, an agency will generally decide when it is 
permitted—or required—to create new rules and regulations.147
Current executive orders generally require CBA to occur 
concurrently with the publication of a proposed rule and again with 
the final rule.148
1. Executive Orders
In light of a desire for greater agency accountability, several 
presidents have issued executive orders requiring that the agency 
weigh the costs and benefits of significant regulatory actions.149
President Reagan issued the first order mandating formal CBA in an 
145. See Posner, supra note 35, at 1144. This is largely because a mere 
description of the purpose and effect of a regulation does not provide any form of 
quantifiable measure by which the projected benefits can be compared to the 
expected costs. See id. at 1144-45.
146. See generally JACOB A. STEIN & GLENN A. MITCHELL, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW (2016) (providing a comprehensive overview of administrative law, including 
the formal and informal rulemaking process).
147. See id. at § 13.01. Preparing new regulations includes extensive pre-rule 
research and evaluation before a proposed rule is ever drafted. See id. Once a 
proposed rule is drafted, the agency must publish notice and the text of the proposed 
rule, or rules, in the Federal Register for public comment. Id. at § 15.01. After the 
comment period closes, the final rule is published along with a statement of basis in 
the Federal Register prior to the effective date. Id.
148. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 638, 644 (1994), reprinted 
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 804-05 (2012) (requiring agencies to submit proposed rules for 
review “before issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking”).
149. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R Sunstein, A New Executive Order for 
Improving Federal Regulation?: Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1489, 1489-90 (2002).
For over twenty years, the executive branch . . . has required regulatory 
agencies to assess the costs and benefits of regulation, and to attempt to 
ensure that the benefits outweigh, or justify, the costs. At least in a formal 
sense, cost-benefit balancing is now the official creed of the executive 
branch . . . . 
Id. at 1489. 
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RIA for all proposed major federal rules and regulations.150 Under 
this order, regulatory actions were not to be taken if projected costs 
outweighed the quantifiable benefits.151 Twelve years later, the 
Clinton administration embraced those early principles first while 
softening the CBA requirements.152
President Clinton created a more flexible requirement and 
expanded upon the regulatory philosophy first adopted by Reagan.153
While the fundamental commitment to CBA remained, the new order 
required only that the benefits justified costs and that agencies craft 
regulations in the most cost-effective manner possible.154 The order’s 
statement of “Regulatory Philosophy and Principles” implies that 
review was intended to apply to official actions beyond just proposed 
and final rules.155 Specifically, § 1(a) states, “In deciding whether 
and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits of 
available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not 
regulating. Costs and benefits shall . . . include both quantifiable 
measures . . . and qualitative measures . . . .”156 The broad definition 
of “regulatory actions” bolsters this interpretation.157 Section 3(e) 
defines a “regulatory action” as “any substantive action by an agency 
. . . that promulgates or is expected to lead to the promulgation of a 
final rule or regulation, including notices of inquiry, advance notices 
of proposed rulemaking, and notices of proposed rulemaking.”158
Finally, in 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 
No. 13,579, which reaffirmed and reenacted the flexible approach to 
CBA analysis laid out in Executive Order 12,866.159
150. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981), revoked 
by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 802 
(2012). Under this order, a “major rule” was defined as one which would have “[a]n 
annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.” 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193. The 
reports described potential costs of the rule, including any adverse effects that 
cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and the identification of those likely to bear 
the costs, in sufficient detail to allow for review by the OMB. Id. at 13,194.
151. Id. at 13,193.
152. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 at 802 (2012) (revoking and replacing Exec. Order 12,291).
153. See Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 149, at 1490.
154. See Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638; see also Bishop & Coffee, supra 
note 109, at 572.
155. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1, 3 C.F.R. at 638-39. 
156. Id. § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 639.
157. Id. § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. at 641.
158. Id.
159. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 (2012).
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Under Executive Order 12,866, there are two stages of 
review.160 The review process relevant to this discussion is one of 
centralized review of regulatory actions by OIRA.161 During that 
review process, both agencies and OIRA have unique 
responsibilities.162
a. Agency Obligations and OIRA’s Duties
One of the responsibilities placed upon agencies is to make an 
initial identification of significant regulatory actions; once identified, 
detailed CBA requirements are triggered.163 Accordingly, unless 
legally prohibited, an agency must submit to OIRA an analysis that, 
to the extent possible, quantifies the underlying costs and benefits of 
the proposed regulatory action, as well as a similar analysis of 
possible alternative actions.164 The findings are then integrated into 
the agency’s decision-making process to the extent such 
consideration is legally permitted.165 Once a final regulation is 
published, all of the underlying information from the CBA process is 
to be made available to the public.166 Additionally, either OIRA or 
the agency must publish a description of any substantive changes 
between the original proposal and the published action.167
The order also articulates OIRA’s responsibilities and several 
limitations regarding the scope of its authority.168 One important 
restriction is that substantive economic review is limited to matters
160. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 4 & 6, 3 C.F.R. at 642-48. First, the 
order requires each executive agency to annually submit to OMB a “Regulatory 
Plan” for those significant regulatory actions that the agency reasonable expects to 
propose or finalize during the “fiscal year or thereafter.” Id.
161. Id. § 6, 3 C.F.R. at 644-48.
162. Id. § 6(a)-(b), 3 C.F.R. at 644-48.
163. Id. § 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. at 645. For “significant regulatory action[s],” 
agencies must provide OIRA with (1) the text of the drafted regulatory action; (2) a 
description of the need for the action; (3) an explanation of how the action will meet 
that need; (4) the anticipated costs and benefits of the action; (5) an explanation of 
how the action is consistent with the authorizing statute; and (6) a description of 
how the action coincides with the president’s regulatory priorities. Id.
§ 6(a)(3)(B)(i)-(ii); 3 C.F.R. at 645.
164. Id. § 6(a)(3)(C)(i)-(ii), 3 C.F.R. at 645-46. 
165. Id.
166. See id. § 6(a)(3)(E)(i)-(iii), 3 C.F.R. at 646.
167. Id. The publications requirement of the executive order also requires 
disclosure of whether changes were proposed by OIRA.
168. Id. § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. at 646-48.
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identified as significant regulatory actions.169 After review, a 
proposed action can be approved or returned to the agency for further 
consideration with an explanation of the specific reasons for the 
return.170 In an effort to improve accountability and public 
confidence, Executive Order 12,866 included significant disclosure 
requirements regarding communications concerning actions under 
formal review.171 As executive review is not directly challengeable in 
court, specific procedures also exist to handle disputes.172
b. Disputes Regarding Review and Final Publication
While not independently enforceable, Executive Order 12,866 
gives OIRA substantial ability to influence or block the publication 
of regulatory actions.173 Unless required by law, an agency is 
169. Id. The key criteria defining a “significant regulatory action” is the 
expectation that the action will have $100 million or more in annual economic 
effect. Id. § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. at 641. Also fairly strict time limits are placed on the 
review process. Id. § 6(b)(2)(A)-(C), 3 C.F.R. at 646-47. All actions prior to the 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking are limited to a ten day review and proposed and 
final rules must be reviewed within ninety days of submission, unless an extension is 
granted. Id. These deadlines were likely to prevent OIRA review from becoming a 
death sentence for controversial regulations.
170. Id. § 6(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 647.
171. Id. § 6(b)(4), 3 C.F.R. at 647-48; see also REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra
note 3, at 36-38 (noting one of the major improvements to executive review 
provided by the Clinton administration was an expansion of disclosure 
requirements). First, notice of all oral ex parte communication with individuals not 
employed by an executive agency concerning an action under review must be sent to 
an OIRA designee. Exec. Order No 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(A), 3 C.F.R. at 647. Second, a 
representative of the issuing agency must be invited to all meetings between OIRA 
personnel and outside parties. Id. § 6(b)(4)(B)(ii), 3 C.F.R. at 647. Third, any written 
communications received by OIRA from non-executive parties regarding an action 
under review must be forwarded to the issuing agency within ten days of receipt. Id.
Finally, OIRA must make publically available a log containing, at a minimum, 
(1) the status of regulatory actions; (2) a notation of all communications forwarded 
to the issuing agency; (3) and the subject matter, dates, times, and names of 
participant for all substantive oral communications between OIRA personnel and 
non-executive parties concerning an action under review. Id. § 6(b)(4)(B)(iii), 3 
C.F.R. at 647-48.
172. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 3, at 26-27; see also Exec. Order. 
No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan 18, 2011).
173. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 3, at 26-27 (explaining how, in 
the early days of OIRA review, many controversial regulations were subjected to 
costly delays or were ultimately abandoned). A 2011 executive order expanded the 
Regulatory Impact Analysis, essentially the same as a cost benefit analysis, to
independent regulatory agencies to the extent permitted by law. See Exec. Order No. 
13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821.
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precluded from publishing a significant regulatory action without 
approval or waiver from OIRA.174 Alternatively, if OIRA fails to 
return the rule or otherwise notify the agency within the applicable 
time period, then publication proceeds.175 Disputes between agencies 
and OIRA must be resolved by the President or Vice President at the 
request of the issuing agency or another agency with a significant 
interest.176 In practice, however, the Order provides little more than a 
mechanism of internal management as outside parties cannot bring 
suit for non-compliance.177
2. Advantages and Weaknesses of Executive Orders
The debate surrounding how best to evaluate the costs of 
federal regulations is extensive.178 From the debate, an obvious 
question arises: Why has such influential policy been carried out 
through non-binding executive orders? Congress has, with varying 
degrees of success, attempted to require all federal regulations to 
undergo some form of CBA.179 Additionally, Congress can impose 
CBA or feasibility cost assessment by including express terms in the 
organic statute delegating authority to the agency.180 Even ambiguous 
provisions, such as a requirement that regulation be “appropriate and 
necessary,” can implicitly require an evaluation of costs.181 However, 
attempts to codify a uniform system of cost assessment in the APA 
have largely been unsuccessful.182 Perhaps it is because of Congress’ 
174. Exec. Order No. 12, 866 § 8, 3 C.F.R. at 648-49.
175. Id. Sometimes significant regulatory actions are required to be 
published within a certain timeframe, thus making the prohibition under the 
executive order an empty threat. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1) (2012) (requiring 
the EPA to publish a list of all “major sources and area sources” of pollutants listed 
in other relevant provisions of that code section within twelve months of November 
15, 1990).
176. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 7, 3 C.F.R. at 648.
177. Id. § 10, 3 C.F.R. at 649.
178. See supra Section I.A (discussing some of the contemporary academic 
discourse surrounding regulatory cost analysis).
179. See Johnston, supra note 23, at 1344-45 (discussing the failed attempt 
of the 104th Congress to carry through on major Republican campaigning issues).
180. See, e.g., Bishop & Coffee, supra note 109, at 579-81, 602-04
(discussing the CBA provisions of the National Securities Market Improvement Act 
of 1996 and the Commodity Exchange Act and how those provisions impacted 
independent financial regulatory agencies).
181. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2709-12 (2015).
182. See Jennifer Nou, Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for 
Deliberative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 601, 607 (2008) 
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inability to pass a uniform policy of regulatory cost assessment that
inspired such important matters to be handled through non-binding 
executive orders.183
Taking action by executive order, rather than waiting for 
legislation, offers a number of advantages.184 Executive orders allow 
the President to make a decisive first move—to set the agenda and 
tone of the conversation quickly and without the delays of the 
legislative process.185 While some orders may be controversial, they 
also reinforce the public’s perception of the President as a leader.186
To paraphrase another scholar, through executive order, the 
President can articulate and solve a public policy problem in one 
decisive action.187
Despite these advantages, there are undeniable weaknesses to 
creating policy through an executive order.188 The most obvious of 
these is the sheer possibility of instability due to the ability of any 
subsequent executive to set aside or replace any given order.189
Moreover, the legal authority of executive orders can sometimes be 
questionable, as presidents do not make law in the same manner as 
Congress.190 Accordingly, executive actions must fit a narrow field of 
qualification between being an effective administrative tool while 
avoiding misuse of Article II powers.191 In the realm of cost 
(“While attempts to formally codify cost-benefit requirements in the APA have 
failed, a mix of executive orders, guidance documents, and best-practice manuals 
nonetheless mandate the procedure as a matter of practice.”).
183. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Executive Orders and Presidential 
Commands: Presidents Riding to the Rescue of the Environment, 21 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 13, 15-16 (2001) (summarizing perceived advantages and 
disadvantages of executive orders).
184. See id. at 15.
185. See id. at 15-16. For example, Theodore Roosevelt set aside millions of 
acres of forest land for federal management in a single afternoon during his 
presidency. Id. at 15.
186. See id.
187. See id. Executive orders allow the president to “depict the crisis and to 
solve it in a single utterance.” Id.
188. See id. at 16.
189. See id. (discussing when an order passed by President Carter was 
overturned in a matter of days with the arrival of the Reagan administration).
190. See id. The leading authority on the scope of presidential power is still 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (providing a three-prong test against which the strength and scope of 
presidential authority is to be evaluated).
191. See Rodgers, supra note 183, at 16-17. In dictum, the D.C. District 
Court provided warning against possible misuse of EO 12,291—issued by President 
Reagan—which served as the principle basis for the currently enforced EO 12,866: 
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consideration, Executive Order 12,866 has largely avoided those 
problems.192 The executive order has, however, led to some 
tensions.193
B. The Relationship of Risk Managers and OIRA in Practice
The early use of CBA by OIRA chilled the promulgation of 
federal regulations and led to tension between that office and federal 
risk managers.194 In the years prior to the Clinton Administration, 
OIRA’s activities and interactions with agencies were largely 
secretive and often resulted in lengthy and expensive delays in the 
promulgation.195 The chill of regulations that followed was 
unsurprising: James Miller, the head of OMB during the Reagan 
Administration, openly advocated against expansive government 
regulation in his prior scholarly work.196 Whether or not OIRA’s 
Yet, the use of EO 12291 to create delays and to impose substantive 
changes raises some constitutional concerns. . . . [I]f used improperly, 
OMB could withhold approval until the acceptance of certain content in 
the promulgation of any new EPA regulation, thereby encroaching upon 
the independence and expertise of EPA. . . . This is incompatible with the 
will of Congress and [is not] a valid exercise of . . . Article II powers.
Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1986). 
192. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 10, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1993), reprinted in 
5 U.S.C. § 601 at 806 (2012). The Order does not affect the availability of judicial 
review under the APA, and it creates no private right of action for noncompliance 
with the order. Id. While the APA does not require compliance with Executive 
Order 12,866, a final rule can be vacated as arbitrary and capricious if relevant cost-
associated factors are not addressed during promulgation. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-44, 55 (1983) (holding the 
NHTSA failed to consider all relevant factors when it created its safety standard). It 
should be noted, however, in that case the agency put too much emphasis on 
monetary costs, and not enough emphasis on factors associated with safety. Id. at 
56-57.
193. See infra Section II.B (discussing tensions caused by executive review 
and the somewhat inconsistent application of review to significant regulatory 
actions).
194. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 3, at 27-29.
195. Id. at 26-27.
196. Id. at 23-25. Several other key appointees in the Reagan administration 
were prominent academics and proponents of the anti-regulatory school of 
economics, and that theory was at the center of original CBA review process. Id.
Some have gone so far as to argue OIRA acts as a zealot for the anti-regulatory 
movement using CBA to create inefficiently lax regulations that do not maximize 
net benefits. See e.g., REVESZ, supra note 3, at 15-51 (noting OIRA rarely seems to 
subject proposed deregulatory decisions to the same scrutiny as those tightening 
regulation); David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L.
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leadership is biased, the power of OIRA to influence federal 
regulation is considerable. 
While Executive Order 12,866 requires OIRA’s formal review 
of all significant regulatory actions before they are published, OIRA 
begins informal review much earlier.197 Informal review is not 
subject to the time or transparency requirements of the order.198 In 
fact, “[i]nformal review can be much more important in the rule-
development process than formal reviews, and can last much 
longer.”199 The modern relationship appears to have changed, as 
agencies are contacting OIRA staff earlier in the rulemaking process 
and informal review has become more prevalent.200
REV. 335, 383, 395-97, 402 (2006) (concluding that CBA has predominantly driven 
regulations to be less stringent); Jeffrey Rudd, The Evolution of the Legal Process 
School’s “Institutional Competence” Theme: Unintended Consequences for 
Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1045, 1079-82 (2006) (arguing that CBA is 
fundamentally flawed and its application to environmental law has perverse the 
law).
197. See Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis 
of EPA Rulemaking from 2001-2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 787 (2008). Between 1994 
and 2005, OIRA reviewed an average of 620 rules annually. See Curtis W.
Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in Federal 
Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1257, 1275 (Table 1) (2006). The office only 
employs about 55 people, of which, about 30 are desk officers who review the 600 
to 700 significant rules and 3,000 agency information requests each year. Id. at 
1307; Frequently Asked Questions, OFF. OF INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo. 
gov/public/jsp/Utilities/faq.jsp [https://perma.cc/D36Q-LJ8P] (last visited Nov. 1, 
2016).
198. See Johnson, supra 197, at 787.
199. See Copeland, supra note 197, at 1279 (discussing one instance where 
the informal review lasted four times as long as the formal review). 
200. Id. at 1280 (noting agencies are contacting OIRA to discuss significant 
rules earlier in the regulatory process, often before formal review begins).
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Table 1
This table was compiled using the raw historic data compiling the reviews of 
economically significant regulatory actions completed by OIRA from 2000 to 2014. 
The data is available at: http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport.
Furthermore, despite several hundred regulatory actions being 
identified as economically significant each year, as Table 1 shows, 
only a small fraction of those are actually formally reviewed.201
Executive Order 12,866 gives OIRA the authority to waive review of 
a regulatory action, and historic reporting data indicates waiver has 
likely become the rule rather than an exception.202 What little data 
OIRA does disclose shows an observable gap between the number of 
significant pre-rule decisions reviewed and proposed rules reviewed 
in subsequent years.203 Accordingly, it is likely that many pre-rule 
actions, which are reasonably likely to lead to a proposed or final 
rule, are never formally reviewed.204
Despite the disclosure requirements of Executive Order 12,866, 
significant concerns remain regarding how much transparency exists 
201. See Table 1, supra Section II.B. 
202. See Table 1, supra Section II.B. When the number of significant pre-
rule decisions reviewed is compared with proposed and final rules reviewed in 
subsequent years, the lack of correlation suggests that OIRA is choosing not to 
formally review many significant regulatory programs until a rule is formally 
proposed.
203. See Table 1, supra Section II.B.




















2000 1 2 32 57 92 582
2001 0 8 41 63 112 700
2002 5 11 44 51 111 669
2003 3 7 43 49 102 715
2004 1 8 27 57 93 626
2005 0 8 29 45 82 611
2006 0 9 32 34 75 600
2007 2 2 37 44 85 589
2008 2 6 56 69 133 673
2009 1 8 50 69 128 595
2010 0 16 49 79 144 690
2011 1 5 52 61 119 740
2012 0 5 30 51 86 424
2013 0 1 48 56 105 418
2014 1 5 50 58 114 452
Sum 17 101 620 843
Avg 1.13 6.73 41.33 56.20 105.40 605.60
1124 Michigan State Law Review 2016
in practice.205 In 2001, OIRA distributed an internal memorandum 
that expanded its disclosure requirements for ex parte 
communications regarding regulatory actions during informal 
review.206 However, whether a rule or regulatory action is under 
review—starting when informal review begins—or whether 
consultations have become substantive is a discretionary judgment 
made by OIRA.207 To make matters worse, only minimal information 
concerning what transpires during meetings between OIRA 
employees, agencies, and private parties is actually made publicly 
available.208
Of the information that is published on OIRA’s website 
regarding meetings and ex parte communications, much is largely 
uninformative and extremely vague.209 Contrary to its own policy, 
OIRA does not appear to regularly publish the substance of the 
communications made during informal review.210 Therefore, changes 
to a proposed rule or regulatory action made during informal review 
may not be disclosed to the public, and if no further changes are 
made in formal review, OIRA approves the regulation as “consistent 
with no change.”211 As OIRA acknowledges that its influence often 
has the most profound effect during the informal stages, not 
publishing those effects makes little sense.212 Without full disclosure, 
much of the communication between agencies, private parties, and 
OIRA—specifically that concerning cost analysis—is still shrouded 
in secrecy.213
205. See Copeland, supra note 197, at 1309-10 (discussing that even the 
Government Accounting Office’s review of OIRA and OMB suggests that 
considerable work may be needed to increase transparency). 
206. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-929, RULEMAKING: OMB’S
ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE 
REVIEWS 53 (2003). 
207. See, e.g., id. at 55.
208. See id. at 54-55.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 55 (OIRA does not consider the disclosure requirements of 
EO 12,866 applicable during informal review).
211. See id. at 57. One justification offered is that such communication is 
part of the deliberative process and does not represent the agencies official position. 
Id.
212. See id. 
213. See Copeland, supra note 197, at 1311-12 (explaining OIRA actually
discourages agencies from disclosing changes made as a result of informal review, 
despite acknowledging that it is during that stage executive review is most 
influential).
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Scholars may not agree about the best method of judging 
regulatory costs,214 but there is little doubt that cost analysis and 
executive review will continue as important aspects of the regulatory 
process.215 The existing structure of executive review has survived 
the test of time and while not perfect, provides clear and plainly 
worded instructions.216 However, the existing structure lacks both 
adequate transparency and clear instructions for its application to 
pre-rule decisions.217
III. A HYBRID FORM OF EARLIER COST ASSESSMENT AND FURTHER 
SUBSTANTIVE GUIDANCE FROM THE EXECUTIVE
The 2015 Michigan v. EPA opinion suggests that a majority of 
the Court expects agencies to weigh the costs of all major regulatory 
decisions, even if those decisions precede the actual drafting of 
rules.218 As all regulatory actions having an annual impact of at least 
$100 million are required to undergo a detailed cost assessment by 
OIRA, that review process is a reasonable mechanism through which 
to evaluate pre-rule decisions as well.219 A narrow reading of 
Executive Order 12,866 would require significant pre-rule decisions 
to be reviewed as economically significant regulatory actions more 
often than currently occurs.220 However, due to possible uncertainty 
and minimal data available to early agency findings and decisions, a 
review process less demanding than formal CBA is required.221
Accordingly, a new executive order should augment the current 
214. Compare Driesen, supra note 36, at 94-95 (concluding that proponents 
of CBA have yet to establish its absolute superiority over the use of all other 
methods), with SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 139 (finding the greatest value in CBA 
lays in its use to prevent the problems of erroneous over or under regulation).
215. See Nou, supra note 23, at 1836 (concluding scholarly work has not 
given enough attention to the power and effect of executive review on the regulatory 
process).
216. See generally Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted 
in 5 U.S.C. § 601, at 802 (2012). See also supra Section II.A (examining the history 
and structure of Exec. Order No. 12,866).
217. See discussion and accompanying footnotes supra Section II.B.
218. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015).
219. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638.
220. Id. §§ 3(f), 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. at 641, 645 (defining significant 
regulatory actions and requiring the more detailed review and CBA of actions 
identified as such). 
221. See Driesen, supra note 36, at 49-50 (noting the primary difference 
between a feasibility standard and CBA is the need, or lack thereof, to quantify and 
monetize the expected benefits of a regulatory solution).
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process by establishing an intermediate feasibility assessment for 
economically significant pre-rule actions.222 The expanded 
assessment of pre-rule actions should be accompanied by a provision 
that also expands disclosure requirements, thus ensuring the review 
process remains as transparent as possible.223
A. Pre-rule Actions Are Economically Significant When Reasonably 
Expected to Lead to Promulgation of an Economically Significant 
Rule
Many pre-rule actions are rarely classified as economically 
significant regulatory actions because they do not directly impose 
costs.224 However, actions like a “significant regulatory action” and 
“notices of proposed rulemaking” easily fit the definition of 
“regulatory action” in Executive Order 12,866.225 Section 3(e) 
defines a regulatory action as “any substantive action by an agency 
(normally published in the Federal Register) that promulgates or is 
expected to lead to the promulgation of a final rule or regulation, 
including notice of inquiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking, 
and notices of proposed rulemaking.”226 Congressionally mandated 
findings, such as whether further regulation is “appropriate and 
necessary” under the CAA, logically fall within this definition when 
the finding is both expected to lead to the promulgation of a final 
rule and published in the Federal Register.227 If a regulatory action is 
222. See discussion and accompanying footnotes infra Section III.A 
(advocating for the establishment of an intermediate feasibility assessment). While 
an extensive change in internal policy could accomplish the same goal, this Note 
advocates for a new Executive Order because the order would be binding on OIRA.
223. See infra Section III.A (advocating for more expansive disclosure
requirements for the substance of executive review).
224. See, e.g., Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air 
Pollutants from Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 
79,830-31 (Dec. 20, 2000) (finding that regulation of coal and oil fired power plants 
are appropriate and necessary, thus adding those units to the category sources 
required to be regulated under the CAA and triggering the need to promulgate 
regulations). 
225. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(e)-(f), 3 C.F.R. at 641.
226. Id. § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. at 641 (emphasis added).
227. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2012). If misused, a mandate to assess the 
costs of early regulatory decisions could potentially violate the statutory 
requirements that are less permissive of cost considerations, such as the initial risk 
assessment for establishing NAAQS or whether regulation is permissible under the 
OSH Act. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001) 
(holding the EPA was precluded from “implementation costs in setting primary and 
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significant, then it is subject to review by OIRA.228 However, only 
significant regulatory actions are subjected to the CBA requirements 
of the current order: those actions with an expected net annual 
economic impact of $100 million or more.229 Pre-rule decisions of 
whether to regulate, which are reasonably expected to lead to an 
economically significant rule, are materially similar to significant 
“notices of inquiry” or “advance notices of proposed rulemaking” 
and should be reviewed under the same, or a similar, standard.230
Consider, again, the decision at issue in Michigan v. EPA.231
The initial appropriate and necessary finding triggered the need to 
promulgate federal rules that were expected to cost at least $100 
million a year.232 That decision was, in fact, a significant regulatory 
action and should have been subject to OIRA review.233 However, 
neither the EPA nor OIRA identified that initial finding as significant 
because it did not directly impose costs; thus, no formal CBA was 
conducted until a proposed rule was issued.234 Had some form of cost 
assessment been integrated into the initial pre-rule determination, 
there would have been no basis for the majority’s holding.235
secondary NAAQS under § 109(b) of the CAA”). Thus, as under the current CBA 
requirements of Executive Order 12,866, an agency would likely need to consider 
cost related factors, or at the very least ensure such consideration does not serve as a 
basis for the final decision.
228. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 3(f), 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. at 641, 645. 
Even deregulatory decisions are to be evaluated under the “economically significant 
regulatory actions” standard. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4:
REGULATORY ANALYSIS (Sept. 17, 2003).
229. See Exec. Order. No. 12,866 §§ 3(f)(1), 6(a)(C)(i)-(ii), 3 C.F.R. at 641, 
645-46.
230. Id. §§ 3(e)-(f), (6)(a)(C)(i)-(ii), 3 C.F.R. at 641, 645-46.
231. 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015).
232. Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from 
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,826 (Dec. 20, 
2000) (finding that regulation of coal and oil fired power plants are appropriate and 
necessary; thus, adding those units to the category sources required to be regulated 
under the CAA and triggering the need to promulgate regulations). 
233. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705-06, 2712 (discussing the EPA’s 
“appropriate and necessary” finding published in 2000).
234. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,831. However, the EPA’s conclusion regarding 
EO 12,866’s applicability is contrary to the text of the Order. A significant 
regulatory action can be an action that imposes costs itself, or is reasonably likely to 
lead to the promulgation of a rule that will impose costs. See Exec. Order No. 
12,866 § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. at 641.
235. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706 (noting that the EPA itself stated that 
the cost assessment performed was in no way a basis for the decision that further 
regulations were appropriate and necessary).
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Since much of the information required for monetizing benefits 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to accurately assess until the 
specific regulatory solution is developed, requiring agencies to 
complete a formal CBA for preliminary findings is unreasonable.236
However, agencies do not decide regulation is necessary off-the-cuff, 
and quite frequently these decisions follow congressionally 
mandated research.237 That Congress required the findings reviewed 
in Michigan v. EPA to be based on years of previously conducted 
research was not unique. Alongside any research required by 
Congress,238 the enacting agency should assess the costs of possible 
solutions before continuing to rule promulgation so long as the 
statute does not forbid such consideration.239
B. Early Feasibility Analysis and Transparency
Two areas most in need of further clarification are: (1) the time 
at which an agency assesses regulatory costs and (2) the level of 
transparency for such review. Typically, OIRA does not formally 
review an agency’s cost assessment until a proposed rule is nearing 
236. See Driesen, supra 36, at 51-52 (explaining that both CBA and 
feasibility standards require an assessment of technological factors compared with 
economic factors, such as profits, but CBA requires the additional, and highly 
difficult, step of quantifying and monetizing averted risks). Driesen proposes that 
since we often lack the scientific knowledge to quantify risks in a completely 
objective manner, such assessments usually represent a policy judgment made on the 
basis of many assumptions. Id. at 52-53. 
237. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1) (2012) (requiring the EPA to study the 
health risks associated with power plant emissions following the 1990 amendments 
to the CAA and requiring the agency to determine if additional regulations were 
needed on the basis of those studies); id. § 7412(n)(2) (requiring the Department of 
Energy to engage in a six year study of emission control technology for pet coke 
overproduction, and requiring the agency to recommend potential regulatory 
solutions on the basis of that study); 29 U.S.C. §§ 671(a), (c)(1), (d) (2012) 
(requiring the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, along with 
other agencies, to study the risk of contamination of workers homes with hazardous 
substances, and recommend regulation on the basis of the findings of such studies).
238. It was the 1990 amendments to the CAA that required the EPA to study 
power plant emissions and determine if additional regulation was needed, see Clean 
Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. III, § 301, 104 Stat. 2531 (1990) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)), but the finding that further regulation was 
appropriate and necessary was not published until ten years later, see Regulatory 
Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,826 (Dec. 20, 2000).
239. See infra Section III.B (proposing integration of a feasibility standard 
into executive review of significant pre-rule agency actions).
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publication.240 However, substantial expenses are incurred prior to 
that date, especially if the research leading to rule promulgation is 
extensive.241 As a procedural matter, the weighing of costs should 
start with pre-rule decisions even before informal review of 
completed drafted rules begins.242 Moreover, much of the 
information exchanged and changes made during informal review is 
not disclosed.243 To create a more complete record and to encourage 
public accountability, all communications between OIRA and 
agencies concerning regulatory actions under review should be fully 
documented and made public.244
1. Deciding Whether to Regulate Should Include Cost 
Consideration
Uncertainty at the early stages of the regulatory process is not 
an excuse to ignore costs if there are methods of cost assessment less 
demanding than a formal CBA available.245 An alternative sometimes 
used later to set standards is an economic or technological feasibility 
principle.246 A feasibility-based analysis for pre-rule decisions would 
provide a reasonable basis on which to decide whether the agency 
should invest further resources to draft specific standards.247
A feasibility-based assessment during executive review should 
not replace CBA outright.248 The CBA method has proven to be an 
effective administrative tool that allows the executive some degree of 
240. See Copeland, supra note 197, at 1273 (noting that formal OIRA review 
is often restricted to proposed and final rules).
241. See id.
242. See id. at 1279-80 (discussing the increase in the use of informal review 
by OIRA, which occurs earlier than formal review and often lasts much longer); see 
also Posner, supra note 35, at 1192 (discussing CBA as a procedural mechanism).
243. See Copeland, supra note 197, at 1279-80.
244. See supra Section II.B (discussing minuscule amount of communication 
actually disclosed in practice).
245. See Driesen, supra note 36, at 63 (concluding that proponents of the 
CBA approach have not articulated why that method is superior to feasibility 
analysis in light of significant valuation and quantification problems).
246. See id.
247. See id. at 51-52 (explaining that a feasibility assessment includes a 
majority of the information needed for the first step of a CBA, but does not require 
the additional complexities of quantifying expected benefits).
248. Cf. id. at 47, 94 (summarizing the authors argument that feasibility is an 
overall superior standard, at least in most areas of environmental law).
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control over federal agencies.249 But formal quantification and 
monetization of benefits for pre-rule decisions, such as whether to 
regulate, is unnecessary. Rather, when deciding whether to regulate 
agencies should first assess the feasibility of various regulatory 
approaches.
As a threshold matter, the agency must determine a need for 
additional regulation, or put differently, that additional regulations 
would have some benefit.250 Some kind of risk assessment is 
typically mandated by the organic statute, and it bestows upon the 
agency the authority to promulgate regulations.251 The actual 
quantification and monetization of such benefits should, however, be 
left for later stages of the regulatory process, such as when drafting 
alternative regulatory proposals. The beauty of a feasibility approach 
is that most, if not all, of the information needed to make such an 
assessment can be gathered from market data and assessments of 
available technology.252
Determining the economic feasibility of whether additional 
regulation should be pursued would function similar to existing 
technological feasibility standards scattered throughout the U.S. 
Code.253 One of the most familiar variations of a feasibility approach 
is the “best available technology” standards used in the Clean 
Drinking Water Act.254 However, unique to a pre-rule assessment, an 
agency need not consider the feasibility of a specific regulation 
249. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 55-60 (discussing the 
foundational principles of CBA and how they have been a significant and major part 
of the federal regulatory system); Posner, supra note 35, at 1198-99 (concluding that 
despite not always producing the most efficient result, CBA lessens the control of 
interest groups and provides a tool for the executive to influence agencies).
250. See Driesen, supra note 36, at 12 (noting that feasibility begins with an 
assessment of pollution control technologies and forms of pollution possible 
technology may reduce).
251. See, e.g., Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 655(b)(5) (2012). The Occupational Health and Safety Act has been interpreted to 
require an initial finding that the workplace is currently unsafe to justify the 
promulgation of regulations. See Indus. Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 
U.S. 607, 642 (1980). But, even in the absence of such a mandate, an agency would 
risk reversal for acting arbitrarily if further regulation would provide no benefit.
252. See Driesen, supra note 36, at 11-12.
253. See id. at 12-13 (summarizing how technology standards under the 
CWA have been applied and evaluated by the Supreme Court).
254. See, e.g., Clean Drinking Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012) 
(requiring the effluent reductions for certain point sources be achieved by
“application of the best available technology economically achievable for such 
category or class” that will meet the requirements of promulgated regulations).
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because it has not been drafted yet.255 To determine whether to 
regulate, an agency need merely consider what range of possible 
regulatory approaches could be utilized to address the identified 
risk.256 Next, the estimated costs of various possible regulatory 
solutions would be determined and compared against various market 
factors, such as operating costs, net profits, and the potential for 
closure.257 If analysis shows that regulations generally would cause 
widespread closures or financially destroy an industry, then 
rulemaking should be abandoned as unfeasible.258 More likely, 
however, the agency will determine that some range of options are 
unfeasible, and the agency will not waste resources developing 
standards utilizing those methods.259
Assessment of feasibility at this preliminary stage would not 
interfere with later CBA of the actual proposed rules. A feasibility 
standard—only pursuing options the industry can reasonably bear—
allows for a much broader range of regulatory possibilities than those 
for which the benefits outweigh or justify the costs.260 Earlier 
assessment of costs would, however, ensure that agencies do not 
waste resources researching and drafting regulations the target entity 
cannot tolerate. Conversely, the later CBA for proposed and final 
rules seeks to ensure that only efficient and justified rules will 
actually be become law.261
255. Cf. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1, 3 C.F.R. 638, 638-39, reprinted in 
5 U.S.C. § 601, at 802 (2012).
256. See Driesen, supra note 36, at 11-12 (describing that feasibility, in the 
environmental context, requires the assessment of a range of technological pollution 
control mechanisms and a comparison of the costs of those options with other 
economic factors). As with a traditional feasibility approach, here you would assess 
a range of possible options and the costs associated with those options, the primary 
difference is the timing with which this application takes place.
257. See id. at 12-16. While most often agencies are considering whether or 
not to impose additional regulations, questions of whether deregulation or loosening 
of regulations are appropriate should undergo the same analysis. It is less likely that 
a decision to loosen regulation would lead to unfeasible costs on the industry in most 
cases. 
258. See id.
259. See id. at 16-19 (“This principle requires maximum reductions at least 
up to the point where plant closures begin to occur[,]” or put differently, when 
further reduction is unfeasible). Utilizing the principle for pre-rule decisions does 
not obligate the agency to promulgate rules up to the maximum feasible level, but 
rather helps to set an initial ceiling on the level of stringency that should be 
considered.
260. See id.
261. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1, 3 C.F.R. at 638-39.
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A feasibility standard also operates well under a number of
statutory mandates that may or may not address costs. The feasibility 
principle appears to fit very well with ambiguous provisions like the 
appropriate and necessary finding subject to debt in Michigan v. 
EPA.262 Intuitively, if tightening regulations would be unfeasible 
because the industry would cease to exist, then it cannot be 
considered appropriate.263 However, pre-rule feasibility analysis fits 
under other regulatory schemes as well.
Many statutes require an initial determination of risk to justify 
rulemaking.264 Until just recently, the Toxic Substance Control Act 
(TSCA) required the EPA to make an initial finding of unreasonable 
risk and then impose the least burdensome combination of several 
enumerated regulatory solutions.265 Under the proposed feasibility
standard, after determining an unreasonable risk exists, the agency 
would next determine which of the enumerated regulatory actions are 
feasible given the specific entity or system to be regulated.266 Since 
any option that is unfeasible cannot possibly be the least burdensome 
solution, there would be no need to consider those options when 
promulgating specific standards.267 The feasible proposals would 
262. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015) (holding it was 
unreasonable for the EPA to decide regulating power plants was “appropriate and 
necessary” without giving any consideration to costs). 
263. See id. at 2709-10 (noting that requiring a floor of regulations no matter 
what the cost is unreasonable). After all, the agency cannot regulate an industry that 
does not exist, and the statute contains no language to suggest that eliminating the 
industry was an option.
264. See e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) 
(2012) (requiring the agency to impose the least burdensome of one or more 
enumerated regulatory options after it determines the manufacture or use of a 
substance “presents . . . an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment”). The least burdensome requirement has been interpreted by the court 
as to require a form of CBA regarding all possible alternative regulatory solutions, 
not just the options proposed by the agency in rulemaking. See Corrosion Proof 
Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1991) (striking down the EPA’s 
asbestos ban).
265. See Corrosion Proof, 947 F.2d at 1217.
266. See id. at 1222-23. On June 22, 2016, President Obama signed the 
Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, 114 Pub. L. No. 
182, 130 Stat. 448 (2016) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-97 (2018)), which 
amended TSCA and removed the least burdensome requirement.
267. See id. An initial feasibility assessment would be more cost effective 
than formally weighing the costs and benefits of each possible alternative. Thus, this 
would be an effective means by which the agency could eliminate the need to
perform a full CBA on some of the enumerated options. So long as such analysis is 
documented and supported by the facts, it would provide a sufficient record to 
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then be reviewed by OIRA before the agency moves forward with 
promulgation, thus giving the Executive additional tools and a level 
of control at the pre-rule phase.268
Some statutes may still forbid integrating the proposed 
feasibility assessment as part of the substantive basis for a proposed 
rule because the statute and precedent forbid such considerations.269
However, under similar conditions, the EPA has primarily performed 
a RIA and CBA for economically significant actions in accordance 
with Executive Order 12,866.270 Those findings are not, however, 
considered in the issuing of the final rule because the organic statute 
precludes cost consideration, and the executive order cannot require 
cost consideration that would violate the law.271 Because the 
proposed feasibility standard is a mere augmentation of the existing 
process under Executive Order 12,866, it too would function as an 
administrative tool, similar to the actions at issue in American 
Trucking.272 But even if a feasibility assessment cannot serve as a 
basis for the rule, the documentation of analyzing economic factors 
at the pre-rule phase will prove useful in supporting a final rule.273
2. Pre-Rule Feasibility in Action
The following hypothetical scenarios will demonstrate how a 
feasibility standard would function with three different results. First, 
when a wide range of regulatory options appear feasible, the agency 
survive the substantial evidence test imposed by the TSCA on review. See id. at 
1223.
268. See Posner, supra note 35, at 1174-79 (discussing the various tools 
through which the Executive can “punish” agencies who under or over regulate).
269. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012); Whitman v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 470-73 (2001) (holding § 109(b) of the Clean Air Act bars 
consideration of costs and economic factors from the process of setting NAAQS).
270. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 
Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,701-02 (July 18, 1997).
271. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1); Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 638, 
644-48, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 805-06 (2012).
272. See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 463; National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38701-02. However, even if the
proposed requirement was implemented as an amendment to the APA requiring a 
uniform feasibility assessment, it would still be precluded if cost consideration was 
contrary to the organic statute. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C 
§ 701(a)(1) (2012).
273. See Driesen, supra note 36, at 51-52 (explaining the requirements for 
application of the feasibility principle represent the first half of information needed 
to perform a full CBA).
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will proceed to rule development.274 Second, when any additional 
regulation is likely to bankrupt the industry or lead to elimination of 
many market participants, regulation should not be pursued.275
Finally, when some degree of regulation may be feasible and should 
at least be considered under a formal CBA, but regulation beyond a 
certain point would be unfeasible; the agency should waste no 
further resources considering regulations at or beyond that point of 
stringency.276
For the purpose of this hypothetical, assume the following 
facts. Under the CAA, the EPA is required to monitor and assess the 
extent and effect of atmospheric deposition277 of hazardous air 
pollutants in the Great Lakes and coastal waters.278 The EPA is 
required to promulgate additional emission regulations if it 
determines (1) that other provisions of the CAA are not adequate to 
prevent “serious adverse effects to public health and serious or 
widespread environmental effects” and (2) that such regulations are 
“necessary and appropriate” to prevent known adverse effects.279
Assume a new substance, compound XX, has been identified as 
hazardous and is emitted as a byproduct of jet fuel combustion. The 
EPA identifies serious environmental risks associated with XX and 
determines that existing regulations under the CAA will not prevent 
widespread degradation of the Great Lakes and coastal waters. Now, 
much like the dilemma regarding power plants, the EPA must 
determine whether to promulgate additional regulations.280
a. Clear Feasibility of Several Options
Under some conditions, further regulation will be so clearly 
feasible that analysis will appear as no more than a formality. 
274. See discussion infra Subsection III.B.2.a.
275. See discussion infra Subsection III.B.2.b.
276. See discussion infra Subsection III.B.2.c.
277. Definitions of “Atmospheric Deposition,” U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, http://ofmpub.epa.gov/sor_internet/registry/termreg/searchandretrieve/ 
termsandacronyms/search.do [https://perma.cc/QYZ8-HUGY] (last visited Nov. 1, 
2016) (type “atmospheric deposition” into the search bar; then select “exact match;” 
then click search and look to the third result). Atmospheric deposition is generally 
defined as the settling of airborne pollutants or particles onto land or water. Id.
Settling may occur through precipitation or in the absence of precipitation. Id.
278. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(m)(1) (2012).
279. Id. § 7412(m)(6).
280. See supra Subsection I.B.3 (discussing the 2015 Michigan v. EPA 
decision).
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Assume, for example, annual net profits for the domestic airline 
industry of $100 billion for the past ten years. The EPA has 
identified a range of possible regulatory solutions to the atmospheric 
deposition problem identified. The implementation of any one of 
these mechanisms would cost the industry between $5 billion and 
$30 billion annually. Further, even at the upper end of the EPA’s 
estimate, it is highly unlikely that any carrier in the United States 
would cut flights or lay off employees.
Under the facts as presented, the EPA would be justified in 
continuing onto rule promulgation with any number of regulatory 
approaches. Regulation is necessary because of the identified risk 
that is not currently being addressed. Moreover, at most, the industry 
would face a thirty-percent decrease in net profit; but even so, the 
industry as a whole would remain highly profitable. Further 
regulation is thus logically appropriate under a feasibility analysis 
because despite costs, even the most stringent regulations are 
bearable by the industry.
At later stages, the EPA may decide that the most stringent 
regulations are unjustified. For example, the monetized benefits of 
the greatest level of regulation may be greatly outweighed by the 
marginal costs of that regulatory scheme.281 However, at this initial 
phase the EPA need not monetize benefits. It merely needs to 
determine that some range of possible regulatory mechanisms are 
feasible after comparing the cost to the industry against profits and 
other economic factors.282 Alternatively, the only possible solutions 
may sometimes be so costly as to make them unfeasible. 
b. No Further Regulation Is Feasible
If an agency cannot identify any possible regulatory solution, 
the costs of which are bearable by the industry as a whole, then the 
agency should not waste resources drafting a proposed rule. Assume 
annual industry profits are the same. However, under this scenario, 
emissions of XX are known to result from the use of an essential 
additive in the manufacture of jet fuel. Currently, the only plausible 
substitute is still in development, and even if available, widespread 
use would exponentially increase fuel prices. Also assume that to 
281. See DRIESEN, ALDER & ENGEL, supra note 71, at 245-46 (discussing 
whether Executive Order 12,866 requires a comparison of overall costs and benefits 
or marginal costs and benefits).
282. See Driesen, supra note 36, at 11-12.
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retrofit airline fleets with an adequate emission control system would 
cost the industry $100 billion annually for five years.
Under these facts, the EPA would likely conclude that even if 
further regulation is deemed necessary, no additional regulations are 
feasible. Banning the proposed fuel additive is not a feasible solution 
because no known substitute is available, and even when ready, the 
substitute is cost prohibitive. Requiring the fleet to be retrofitted 
would solve the problem, but it is not feasible to force an industry to 
endure net zero profits for five years. In light of these considerations, 
the agency would be hard pressed to justify spending resources 
promulgating proposed rules because all available regulatory 
mechanisms will cripple the industry and likely fail the later CBA.
However, even if regulations are not feasible now, that finding 
does not preclude promulgation of different rules at a later date. The
findings of the feasibility analysis show that currently it is not 
reasonable to dedicate additional resources to developing a rule. 
Regulatory dilemmas are rarely so black and white. The feasibility 
principle is most useful when applied to eliminate a range of possible 
mechanisms, thus narrowing the field to those which should be given 
further consideration.283
c. Thinning the Field
Using a feasibility analysis for decisions of whether to regulate 
will be most effective when applied to situations where it can guide 
the scope of later rulemaking. Lack of feasibility can eliminate some 
regulatory mechanisms initially, thereby focusing the bulk of later 
resources on options that are more likely to survive review. While 
some agencies may already assess feasibility informally when 
deciding whether to regulate, requiring agencies to make known the 
options being considered prior to rule drafting allows for more robust 
public participation during later stages.
283. An exception to the general rule that unfeasible regulations should not 
be pursued may exist where the intent of Congress was to force technological 
development or eliminate a source of risk. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, 
Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental Regulation, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
943 (1994) (discussing various efforts by Congress to force the development of new 
technology by imposing requirements that cannot be met by current technology). 
However, only when congressional intent is unambiguous and precise should an 
agency proceed to develop clearly unfeasible regulations; because, as Professor 
McGarity’s essay shows, even when statutory language requires the development of 
currently unfeasible regulations, such laws often fail in the courts. Id. at 955-58.
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For this scenario, assume the facts are the same as scenario (b) 
with the following changes.284 The alternative substitute, while 
slightly more expensive, has already been developed and is available 
on the market. An emission control device is also available, but it 
would cost $80 billion annually, over five years, to retrofit the entire 
fleet. However, it is predicted that requiring the emissions device 
may result in some smaller airlines closing and may cause large-
scale layoffs for several larger carriers. 
Scenario (c) provides a more challenging dilemma for the EPA, 
and one that is likely more accurate of reality. Even without 
quantifying benefits, the agency may conclude that an eighty-percent 
reduction in profits along with likely closures and job losses is 
unfeasible, despite the industry as a whole surviving. A finding of 
infeasibility is reasonable in light of a core principle of feasibility—
avoiding disproportionally concentrated negative externalities.285
Additionally, unless the agency expected monetized benefits to be 
very large, it would be hard to justify imposing a substantial 
financial burden on an industry.286 However, the EPA may go 
forward with various options for phasing out the old fuel additive for 
a substitute. The projected increase in cost caused by the substitute 
would be weighed against industry profits, job stability, and overall 
market function. If the initial cost would be high or borderline 
unfeasible, then the agency may also need to project the effect of 
increase in demand from phasing out chemical XX on costs 
associated with the substitute. If the decline in prices is likely to 
offset decreased profits over time, then the EPA is more likely to 
determine further regulation is feasible and begin drafting a rule. If 
feasibility is a close call, then an agency would likely be justified in 
moving forward with rule promulgation whatever its conclusion.
3. Public Disclosure
Despite significant improvements to transparency, much of 
OIRA’s work—and its interactions with agencies—is still shrouded 
284. See supra Subsection III.B.2.b.
285. See Driesen, supra note 36, at 21 (noting the feasibility principle as 
applied to setting emissions standards allows for standards to be set up to the point 
where widespread industry closures will occur).
286. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2709 (2015) (analogizing the 
EPA’s decision to regulate no matter what the cost as similar to “buy[ing] a Ferrari 
without thinking about cost, because [the buyer] plans to think about cost later”).
1138 Michigan State Law Review 2016
in secrecy.287 A large amount of communication between OIRA, 
agencies, and outside parties occurs before actions are officially 
under review, and those communications, even if substantive, are not 
subject to the disclosure requirements of Executive Order 12,866.288
Moreover, courts and the public generally have limited access to 
those proceedings or a record of their substance.289 Over 600 rules 
are reviewed by OIRA each year, and on average, 105 of those are 
designated as economically significant.290 It would be reasonable to
assume that many significant rules were a topic of discussion within 
the agency for some time before formal review began.291 Yet the 
public disclosure requirements of the current executive order do not 
apply to the conversations and bargains made about the nation’s 
most important regulations during informal review and surrounding 
pre-rule decisions.292
Agencies are now contacting OIRA staff earlier in the 
rulemaking process, which likely makes informal review and pre-
rule discussions more important than at any other point in history.293
OIRA continues to transform itself from being merely a gatekeeper 
for promulgation to being a counselor and advisor for agency 
heads.294 Other agencies, the courts, and the public have a right to 
know what occurs behind closed doors.295 Short of congressional 
287. See Copeland, supra note 197, at 1309-10 (discussing ongoing concerns 
about a lack of transparency in OIRA review, despite the requirements of executive 
orders).
288. See Johnson, supra note 197, at 787.
289. See Copeland, supra note 197, at 1279 (discussing one instance where 
the informal review lasted four times as long as the formal review). “Informal 
review can be much more important in the rule-development process than formal 
reviews, and can last much longer.” Id.
290. See Table 1, supra Section II.B.
291. See Copeland, supra note 197, at 1278-79 (quoting OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, MAKING SENSE OF REGULATION: 2001 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COST 
AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND 
TRIBAL ENTITIES 43 (2001)) (“A common yet informal practice is for agencies to 
share preliminary drafts of rules and/or analyses with OIRA desk officers prior to 
formal decision making at the agency.”). 
292. The pessimist might conclude that these very rules are being perverse 
while still in their infancy.
293. See Copeland, supra note 197, at 1280.
294. See Posner, supra note 35, at 1193.
295. Cf. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra 206, at 214 (offering the 
opinion that changes made during informal review should not be disclosed). See 
Copeland, supra 197, at 1309-10 (discussing ongoing concerns regarding a lack of 
transparency with OIRA review).
Rethinking Executive Review 1139
action, the best way to address this concern is further expansion of 
the existing disclosure requirements in a new executive order.
Coupling a feasibility assessment for pre-rule review with 
expanded disclosure requirements promotes effective regulation and 
democratic governance.296 Therefore, the disclosure requirements 
already applied to RIA and CBA should be extended to apply to a 
feasibility standard to pre-rule decisions and informal review.297
However, a new order must go further. First, the new order should 
explicitly require OIRA to publish a summary of the substance of—
and participants to—meetings and communications concerning 
significant regulatory actions to be published as these actions 
occur.298 Second, the provision giving OIRA the ability to waive the 
review process for significant regulatory actions should be 
eliminated. Finally, some principle of accountability must be 
established to ensure the information is easily accessible to the 
general public and that online databases are maintained. Moreover, 
while there are certainly downsides to an executive mandate, it is 
preferable to amending the APA.299
C. Reasons to Avoid Amending the Administrative Procedure Act
Requiring cost consideration for pre-rule decisions will help 
agency rules survive judicial review of the final product, even if that 
requirement is not independently reviewable. Executive Order 
12,866 and its predecessors have never included an independent 
legal right of review, even for final rules.300 When executive orders 
are utilized as tools to increase administrative efficiency, creation of 
independent legal rights is not the objective. Likewise, this proposal 
is intended as a mechanism to create a more comprehensive 
296. See Driesen, supra note 36, at 77-80 (suggesting that evaluating health, 
safety, and environmental regulations on the basis of feasibility comports more 
closely with the public’s expectations for both accountability and transparency).
297. See Exec. Order. No. 12,866 §§ 6(a)(E), (b)(4)(D), 3 C.F.R. 638, 644-
48 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 804-06 (2012) (containing disclosure 
requirements).
298. See Copeland, supra note 197, at 1291-93, 1309-10 (discussing that 
even under the current disclosure requirements the material published by OIRA does 
not make clear the participants or substance of meetings); Nou, supra note 23, at 
1823-24 (describing how disclosure requirements under the current executive order 
are often not met in practice).
299. See infra Section III.C (describing the reasons to avoid a direct 
amendment of the APA).
300. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 10, 3 C.F.R. at 649.
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administrative record regarding decisions made early in the 
rulemaking process, and to make those decisions more transparent.301
These goals can be achieved through the use of executive action, 
thereby avoiding the headache and debate that would inevitably 
accompany a congressional action.
Adding a uniform cost consideration requirement to the APA 
has been challenging.302 At its core, the APA relies on the 
participation of private parties for rulemaking to function.303 The 
additional pre-rule requirements proposed do not, however, need to 
be codified in the APA. The requirements of the APA will ensure 
any substance of the feasibility assessment relied upon in proposed 
and final rules will be published as part of the substance and basis.304
Congress has, for the most part, left supervision of agencies to the 
executive.305
As a functional matter, an executive order is a better 
mechanism through which to require assessment of agency policy 
decisions at the pre-rule phase. One reason is that pre-rule 
determinations of whether regulation is necessary does not fit under 
the APA’s current definition of a “rule.”306 Pre-rule determinations 
do, however, fit within the time-tested definition of “regulatory 
action” in Executive Order 12,866.307 While formal amendment to 
301. See supra Section III.B (discussing the need for greater transparency).
302. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative 
Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 96-98 (2003) (summarizing 
some perceived flaws of the APA and various criticisms the statute has received 
since its promulgation).
303. See id. at 102-03.
304. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012) (requiring 
notice of proposed rulemaking to include “reference to the legal authority under 
which the rule is proposed; and either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or 
a description of the subjects and issues involved”). Additionally, any findings relied 
upon for the final rule will usually be included in the statement of basis and purpose. 
Id. § 553(c) (“[T[he agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general 
statement of their basis and purpose.”).
305. See Rubin, supra note 302, at 134-36 (summarizing the minimal actions 
Congress has taken to guide executive review of administrative decisions).
306. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (defining a rule as “the whole or a part of an 
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to 
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, 
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency”).
307. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. at 641 (defining regulatory 
action as “any substantive action by an agency (normally published in the Federal 
Register) that promulgates or is expected to lead to the promulgation of a final rule 
or regulation, including notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking, 
and notices of proposed rulemaking”). 
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the APA could theoretically provide a more permanent solution,
Congress’s reluctance to change the APA has deep roots and seems 
unlikely to change.308
The acquiescence of Congress to executive review over the last 
several decades indicates a lack of ability or desire to formally guide 
these efforts.309 The simplicity of a feasibility assessment also makes 
it superior to CBA for pre-rule decisions.310 Moreover, an early 
feasibility requirement would help to ensure agencies are acting in an 
economically rational manner when deciding whether additional 
regulations are required, which is an ideal the APA itself does not 
always accomplish.311 Additional executive oversight is likely to 
meet some resistance from those who already believe the federal 
regulatory process is already too slow and cumbersome.
D. Potential Opposition to More Extensive Executive Review
The proposal discussed thus far may face criticism as it 
imposes additional burdens on the regulatory process, thereby 
slowing down regulation.312 Some may also believe additional 
requirements will actually push the regulatory process further out of 
public view313 and result in an unreasonable blanket patch for unique 
agency problems.314 These criticisms are not unique to this proposal; 
in fact, they are the kind of concerns that face any proposal to 
308. See Rubin, supra note 302, at 136-37. Congress has added some 
incremental requirement to federal rule making and executive review, but nothing 
comprehensive. See Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 
(1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (2012)); Paperwork Reduction Act, Pub. L. 
No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified as reenacted at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-02
(2012)); Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 
(1995) (imposing requirements similar to Executive Order 12,866 on federal 
mandates that impact states) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
309. See Rubin, supra note 302, 136-37.
310. Cf. supra Subsection II.A.1. See Rubin supra note 302, at 136-37
(arguing the process of executive review is exactly the kind of process that should be 
addressed by the APA). 
311. See Rubin, supra note 302, at 162-63 (advocating for a new APA that 
would codify the principle of instrumental rationality into agency rulemaking, which 
would ensure that agencies implement legislative and presidential goals in the most 
effective manner possible).
312. See infra Subsection III.D.1.
313. See infra Subsection III.D.2.
314. See infra Subsection III.D.3.
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augment the regulatory process.315 However, the force and magnitude 
of opposition is not sufficient to impede the value of a feasibility 
mandate.316
1. Excessively Burdensome
To counter the criticisms that a pre-rule feasibility standard is 
unduly burdensome requires consideration of two factors. First, the 
utilization of a feasibility standard for pre-rule actions would remove 
the need to quantify and monetize benefits while a regulation is still 
in the womb.317 Assessing the economic feasibility of additional 
regulation consists of two primary steps. Initially, a range of possible 
regulatory solutions must be identified prior to crafting the details of 
a specific proposal.318 Next, the estimated economic costs of those 
options are compared with the economic characteristics of the target 
industry.319 Accordingly, while not without burden, feasibility is 
much simpler and cheaper than monetizing anticipated benefits for a 
formal CBA.320
Moreover, for many decisions, agencies will compile 
significant scientific and economic data prior to deciding if further 
regulation is necessary.321 While this is not true for all regulatory 
actions, those that are of such a magnitude as to lead to a significant 
rule will almost always be accompanied by substantial research.322
Accordingly, feasibility analysis and OIRA review will not 
excessively delay the regulatory process because much of the 
315. See Rubin, supra note 302, at 97-99 (describing a number of criticisms 
of the APA).
316. See infra Subsections III.D (summarizing why the proposed feasibility 
standards survives likely critiques).
317. See supra Subsection III.B.1; Driesen, supra note 36, at 12.
318. See supra Subsections III.B.1-2; see also Driesen, supra note 36, at 8-
12.
319. See Driesen, supra note 36, at 8-12.
320. Id. at 49-50, 89-90. Recall that a formal CBA requires detailed 
quantification even noneconomic benefits.
321. See supra Section III.A.
322. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(1)(m)(5) (1990) (requiring 
studies of emissions from power plants to be completed within three years of 
enactment followed by regulations if determined appropriate and necessary). The 
required studies and appropriate and necessary finding did not, however, come until 
almost ten years later. See Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air 
Pollutants From Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825 (Dec. 
20, 2000).
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research needed is synonymous with what the agency already 
performs to prepare for later review.323
2. Pushing the Administrative Process Out of the Public Eye
Expanding the disclosure requirements already present in 
Executive Order 12,866 enhances accountability at both an 
administrative and political level.324 Meaningful participation by the 
public in rulemaking is maintained because the communications 
regarding all regulatory actions under OIRA review are published 
more quickly and with greater detail.325 Increased disclosure 
requirements are burdensome, but OIRA is already in the business of 
keeping and managing documents and data.326 The recommended 
expansions would increase the likelihood that what is disclosed will 
be practically useful and informative. Further, the General 
Accounting Office has already recommended similar expansions, but 
they have not been fully implemented in practice.327 The public 
should be able to review the full scope of decisions made by the 
government throughout the rulemaking process, including what 
parties have lobbied to influence those decisions.328
323. See Driesen, supra note 36, at 49-50 (an assessment of feasibility 
presupposes cost assessment, which is the first step in performing a CBA).
324. See id. at 80-85 (arguing the feasibility principle better serves 
democratic accountability, as well as offering fewer opportunities for special interest 
groups to influence rulemaking). 
325. See supra Subsection III.B.3.
326. See Exec. Order. No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(E), (b)(4)(D), 3 C.F.R. 638, 644-
48 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 804-06 (2012) (containing disclosure 
requirements); see also Copeland, supra note 197, at 1273-75 (describing OIRA’s 
recordkeeping).
327. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 206, at 14-15
(recommending several changes to improve OIRA’s compliance with the public 
disclosure requirements of EO 12,866). Three years after the General Accounting 
Office made these recommendations, scholars still continue to note less than 
desirable compliance. See Copeland, supra note 197, at 1309. Some have suggested 
OIRA should be subjected to the same disclosure requirement as provided under the 
APA. See, e.g., REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 3, at 171-72.
328. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 3, at 171-72 (arguing OIRA 
should be subject to the same transparency requirements as under the APA for 
“rulemaking like” activities).
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3. A Uniform Executive Requirement Is the Best Option
With one exception, Congress has been largely unsuccessful in
mandating any form of uniform cost assessment for federal rules.329
Efforts to codify specific CBA requirements continue to rise,330 but 
the current piecemeal approach to regulation is inefficient and 
undesirable. As the congressional unanimity needed to amend the 
APA is lacking, the most effective solution remaining is a new 
executive order to improve on the existing process of review by 
OIRA.331 A new order would allow the president to set the tone for 
how to review regulatory costs while leaving Congress free to 
discard the requirements as needed.332 Moreover, while the reasons 
agencies regulate vary according to the jurisdiction and scope of 
authority delegated by Congress, the feasibility standard proposed 
fits exceptionally well in a uniform order.
Executive Order 12,866 is not aimed at regulation of a specific 
type but rather broadly at those regulations expected to impose 
significant economic costs.333 Because the proposed feasibility 
standard maintains the structural requirements of the order, it will 
only impose additional burdens on regulatory decisions of substantial 
economic magnitude. Moreover, this proposal also retains the 
preclusion against superseding contrary requirements imposed by 
federal law.334 Congress remains free to exempt specific regulatory 
decisions from the requirement or to impose more stringent 
329. See Rubin, supra note 302, at 136 (noting the Unfunded Mandate 
Reform Act of 1915 requires CBA of regulations that have significant “economic 
impact on state and local governments”).
330. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 2410, § 22601(c)(3) (114th Cong., 2015) 
(introduced in the House May 19, 2015) (requiring the National Rail Development 
Plan to include an analysis of costs and benefits of potential investments weighing a 
number of enumerated factors).
331. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 3, at 171 (suggesting a new 
executive order to redefine the role of OIRA). The order proposed by Revesz and 
Livermore would move OIRA into a more agenda setting role and away from CBA 
altogether. Id.
332. See Rodgers, supra note 183, at 15-16 (describing executive action as 
an aggressive first move that can be utilized strategically). 
333. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. at 641 (requiring CBA of 
regulatory actions identified as significant, usually those that impose $100 million or 
more in annual economic costs). The proposed order would maintain the significant 
regulatory action criteria, and thus only apply to decisions concerning regulation of 
great economic magnitude.
334. See id. § 1(b)(10), 3 C.F.R. at 639.
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requirements as it deems necessary.335 Also, agencies will be better 
able to implement new requirements if imposed only on a limited 
number of significant rules rather than generally under the APA.336
Under this proposal, the feasibility of a pre-rule decision will serve 
as a default question for agencies unless Congress expresses contrary 
intent. 
Uncertainty at the point of deciding whether to regulate may 
preclude application of a detailed CBA, but this does not nullify the 
need for cost assessment.337 Requiring a feasibility analysis for pre-
rule regulatory actions will promote efficiency and effectiveness of 
final rules, with minimal added burden.338 Pre-rule accountability 
will increase efficiency by encouraging agencies to invest significant 
time and resources only in those rules that are economically 
achievable.339
CONCLUSION
Cost assessment is an essential part the regulatory process.340
Regulatory decisions that are not based on a thorough consideration 
of all relevant factors can hardly expect to survive judicial review.341
Generally, unless Congress has stated otherwise, agencies are free to 
and should consider a variety of costs associated with potential 
regulatory actions.342 As written, Executive Order 12,866 provides 
the framework for review of significant actions once rulemaking is 
335. See id. § 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. at 644 (stating that the analysis required 
by the order must only be complied with as legally permitted).
336. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.1, Section III.A (noting the review 
under discussion only applies to economically significant rules).
337. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2710-11 (2015) (dismissing the 
dissent’s concerns regarding uncertainty and holding that even if cost was 
considered at later stages, it did not cure the initial and reversible defect committed 
by the EPA). 
338. See discussion of hypotheticals supra Subsection III.B.2.
339. See supra Subsection III.B.1 (discussing the application of feasibility to 
pre-rule evaluation).
340. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 19-20 (noting the acceptance and 
integration of CBA into the agenda of presidents and agencies since Reagan and 
predicting such embrace will continue). 
341. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (“It follows that agency 
action is lawful only if it rests ‘on a consideration of the relevant factors.’”). 
342. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 31 (presenting perceived default rules 
of CBA).
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underway;343 however, holes in the effectiveness and transparency of 
the process remain.
While Executive Order 12,866 appears to require formal 
review of preliminary decisions,344 clarification on that issue is 
needed. Weighing costs and benefits is a valuable tool in rulemaking, 
but formal CBA is not the best mechanism for evaluating all 
regulatory decisions.345 Utilizing a feasibility standard is a reasonable 
way to assess the expected costs of early regulatory decisions before 
unrecoverable resources are expended drafting specifically tailored 
rules.346 Coupled with greater accountability, this standard will result
in efficient and stable regulations and promote public confidence by 
bringing the administrative process out of the shadows.347
343. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.1 (discussing the pertinent text of 
Executive Order 12,866).
344. See discussion supra Section III.A. The executive order that has been 
the primary focus of discussion provides separate definitions for a “rule” and 
“regulatory action,” Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(d)-(e), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994), 
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 803 (2012), but only provides for the most critical 
review and CBA requirements for significant regulatory actions that will, or are 
likely to, lead to rules. Id. § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. at 644-45.
345. See Driesen, supra note 36, at 94 (concluding feasibility is at least as 
viable as CBA for many regulatory structures). 
346. See supra Sections III.A-B.
347. See supra Sections III.C-D.
